At 10:52 PM +0100 10/21/02, Adam Back wrote:
On Sun, Oct 20, 2002 at 10:38:35PM -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
There may be a hole somewhere, but Microsoft is trying hard to get
it right and Brian seemed quite competent.
It doesn't sound breakable in pure software for the user, so
do so and get
a green light from the courts. Note today's Warez crackdown.
Maybe there is some compromise possible where a core crypto library
is kept free of U.S. contributions?
Arnold Reinhold
At 10:27 AM -0800 12/11/01, Dima Holodovich wrote:
>On Tuesday 11 December 2001 06:29 am,
At 12:18 AM -0600 12/11/01, Jim Choate wrote:
>On Mon, 10 Dec 2001, John Gilmore wrote:
>
>> NSA's export controls. We overturned them by a pretty thin margin.
>> The government managed to maneuver such that no binding precedents
>> were set: if they unilaterally change the regulations tomorrow t
>"Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
>> Precisely. What is the *real* threat model?
>>
>> History does indeed show that believed-secure ciphers may not be, and
>> that we do indeed need a safety margin. But history shows even more
>> strongly that there are many better ways to the
At 5:43 AM -0400 10/5/2000, Vin McLellan wrote:
>...
>
>As the basis of an AES conspiracy theory, the two Hitachi
>patents strike me as pretty frail. (Rijndael is clearly a powerful
>and elegant algorithm, fully a peer if not the Obvious Choice among
>the five great cryptographic creati
