An Analysis of Compromised Remailers

2003-12-16 Thread John Young
This came in response to Cryptome's posting of Len Sassman's comments on remailers. - From: S Subject: Re: remailers-tla.htm Compromised Remailers, December 15, 2003 Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2003 16:16:17 -0700 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Message-Id: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Thank you for posting

Re: An Analysis of Compromised Remailers

2003-12-16 Thread Len Sassaman
On Mon, 15 Dec 2003, John Young wrote: This came in response to Cryptome's posting of Len Sassman's comments on remailers. (BTW, John -- while the threat originally started out as being about compromised remailers, my comments had little to do with that title. Perhaps remailer security would

Re: Compromised Remailers

2003-12-15 Thread Keith Ray
Quoting Bill Stewart [EMAIL PROTECTED]: At 06:49 PM 12/13/2003 +0100, some provocateur claiming to be Anonymous wrote: A question for the moment might well be how many if any of the remailers are operated by TLAs? Remailers are secure if at least one remailer in a chain is _not_

An Analysis of Compromised Remailers

2003-12-15 Thread John Young
This came in response to Cryptome's posting of Len Sassman's comments on remailers. - From: S Subject: Re: remailers-tla.htm Compromised Remailers, December 15, 2003 Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2003 16:16:17 -0700 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Message-Id: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Thank you for posting

Re: An Analysis of Compromised Remailers

2003-12-15 Thread Len Sassaman
On Mon, 15 Dec 2003, John Young wrote: This came in response to Cryptome's posting of Len Sassman's comments on remailers. (BTW, John -- while the threat originally started out as being about compromised remailers, my comments had little to do with that title. Perhaps remailer security would

Re: Compromised Remailers

2003-12-15 Thread Len Sassaman
remailers. And if the TLAs are the dominant users of remailers, sending dummy messages through, they get the same benefits as when their are few users or compromised remailers. For example, if the typical mix latency is 20 messages, and TLAs account for 98% of the traffic through remailers

Re: Compromised Remailers

2003-12-15 Thread Keith Ray
Quoting Bill Stewart [EMAIL PROTECTED]: At 06:49 PM 12/13/2003 +0100, some provocateur claiming to be Anonymous wrote: A question for the moment might well be how many if any of the remailers are operated by TLAs? Remailers are secure if at least one remailer in a chain is _not_

Re: Compromised Remailers

2003-12-14 Thread Bill Stewart
At 06:49 PM 12/13/2003 +0100, some provocateur claiming to be Anonymous wrote: A question for the moment might well be how many if any of the remailers are operated by TLAs? The TLAs have proposed running various anonymizers for China and other countries that have oppressive eavesdroppers. If

Re: Compromised Remailers

2003-12-14 Thread Bryan L. Fordham
Tim May wrote: I haven't carefully looked at the current source code (if it's available) for things like Type II Mixmaster remailers, things which offer reply-blocks. The source is available for mixmaster. However, Type II does not offer reply blocks. Certainly for the canonical Cypherpunks

Re: Compromised Remailers

2003-12-14 Thread Bill Stewart
At 06:49 PM 12/13/2003 +0100, some provocateur claiming to be Anonymous wrote: A question for the moment might well be how many if any of the remailers are operated by TLAs? The TLAs have proposed running various anonymizers for China and other countries that have oppressive eavesdroppers. If

Re: Compromised Remailers

2003-12-14 Thread Tim May
between sent messages, received messages, and actions take place. A signal recovery problem, perhaps akin to some military sorts of problems. (Note that this few users problem is essentially isomorphic to compromised remailers. And if the TLAs are the dominant users of remailers, sending dummy