On Mon, 13 Aug 2001, Black Unicorn wrote:
>Do I think that software should have products liability attached to it? No.
>Do I think strict liability stifles innovation? No.
I would actually like to make a smaller point here. Broadly I
agree with BU, but I'd like to analyze it a little.
If
On Mon, 13 Aug 2001, Eric Murray wrote:
> Especially with the press constantly telling them "Linux is hard".
If they listen to the press, they have only themselves to blame.
Sheep frequently end as yummy lamb chops.
> Most people know that MS software is buggy and inecure. But they think
> that
- Original Message -
From: "Eugene Leitl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Faustine" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, August 13, 2001 7:49 AM
Subject
On Mon, 13 Aug 2001, Trei, Peter wrote:
> I hate to say this, but until software developers are held (at least
> at the corporate level) in some way liable for their failures, there
> will be little or no improvement in the situation.
I think this is the wrong approach to the situation. Making p
At 07:54 PM 8/7/01 -0700, Petro wrote:
>At 1:04 AM -0500 8/7/01, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>On Mon, 6 Aug 2001, Petro wrote:
>>
>>> Were that to happen, I'd bet a bunch of new remailers would be
>>> in place before the heliocopters were finished refueling.
>>
>>Obviously you don't run one: t
--
On 6 Aug 2001, at 10:13, Ray Dillinger wrote:
> Offhand, I'd estimate that if three US remops were taken down
> forcefully, and the federal law looked as though any other
> could be, all but two or three hardcases would cease operating
> remailers in the USA. That would wipe out well ov
--
On 7 Aug 2001, at 7:38, Declan McCullagh wrote:
> Also, users won't immediately know about the new remailers or
> have any idea of their reliability. And while the Feds may be
> generally sluggish, when it comes to law enforcement (that is,
> remailer raids on anti-terrorism pretexts), I su
On Tue, Aug 07, 2001 at 01:04:29AM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> On Mon, 6 Aug 2001, Petro wrote:
>
> > Were that to happen, I'd bet a bunch of new remailers would be
> > in place before the heliocopters were finished refueling.
>
> Obviously you don't run one: the resources required are
At 11:33 AM -0400 8/5/01, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>Last I checked, the vast bulk of remailers were in North America and
>Europe. Given sufficient provocation (Bush twins kidnapped, Osama
>talking biochemwomdterror in DC), I could easily see a coordinated set
>of pre-dawn raids to "gather evidence"
On Monday, August 6, 2001, at 02:01 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Just speculation, or course, but I suspect there are quite a few
> people out there who would be willing and able to run remailers but
> don't bother doing it because there's no perceived need
> and no real payoff.
>
> I believe
On 6 Aug 2001, at 10:13, Ray Dillinger wrote:
> Offhand, I'd estimate that if three US remops were taken down
> forcefully, and the federal law looked as though any other could
> be, all but two or three hardcases would cease operating remailers
> in the USA.
Depends on exactly what you mea
Ray Dillinger wrote:
> Instead, they will attack the weakest point -- trying to drive
> remailer operators out of business and thus destroy the
> infrastructure you need. That is the threat model I'm concerned
> about, and given that network monitoring is now automatable and
> cheap, it is entire
On Mon, 6 Aug 2001, Ray Dillinger wrote:
> in the USA. That would wipe out well over 70% of the remailers,
> leaving a very small universe indeed to monitor.
In case this happens I'll be happy to run one on a DSL line. I'm sure many
others will suddenly see the light, too.
It would also motiva
On Mon, 6 Aug 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>I'm quite aware of the attack. It's not guaranteed successful yet.
True. But it beats the snot out of guessing keys.
Offhand, I'd estimate that if three US remops were taken down
forcefully, and the federal law looked as though any other could
b
I'm quite aware of the attack. It's not guaranteed successful yet. If
you've paid attention to our lawyers recently it sounds like the battle
is sporadic and the outcome mixed.
Until the heavy hand wipes out remailers the fate of an individual
message is interesting. So as of even date being able
--
On 5 Aug 2001, at 14:17, Sampo Syreeni wrote:
> "Conforming to international treaties" *is* the hip way to
circumvent the
> constitution.
As we recently saw in the money laundering treaties, different
nations have rather different interpretations of international treaties.
Some time bac
--
On 5 Aug 2001, at 16:07, Sampo Syreeni wrote:
> AFAICS, it's likely a matter of priorities -- currently anonymity does not
> pose a significant threat to governments. If that changes, the heat will
> intensify, possibly to a point where means currently unimaginable could be
> employed (e.g.
On Saturday, August 4, 2001, at 12:32 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> --
> On 3 Aug 2001, at 20:59, Ray Dillinger wrote:
>> the point is, that's enough. Both endpoints on such a packet's
>> route are participants, obviously. If they want to shut it
>> down, and they have seen such a packet,
--
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Ray Dillinger wrote:
> You cannot have encryption technologies advancing and leaving the law
> behind, so long as any vital part of the infrastructure you need is
> traceable and pulpable by the law.
Child porn still gets distributed through usenet. Silencing
"alt.ano
On Sat, 4 Aug 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> As governments become more lawless, and laws become mere desires of the
> powerful, rather than any fixed set of rules, the state is increasing
> less one powerful entity, rather it becomes numerous entities each with
> their own conflicting desires
--
On 3 Aug 2001, at 12:07, Tim May wrote:
> A distributed set of remailers in N
> different jurisdictions is quite robust against prosecutorial fishing
> expeditions
As governments become more lawless, and laws become mere desires of the powerful,
rather than any fixed set of rules, the sta
On Fri, Aug 03, 2001 at 08:59:41PM -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote:
> And in an agent provocateur mode, the software is illegal the
> minute they want it to be -- all they have to do is show a
> DMCA violation (which they can manufacture at will) and declare
> the software illegal as a "circumventio
Tim May:
> Just so. And some of the recent "remailers can't work" critics
> (Dillinger, Farr) are breathtakingly ignorant of what was common
> knowledge in 1992. Worse, they haven't heeded recommendations that
> they get themselves up to speed.
I didn't say that.
I think Ray really did, eith
On Fri, Aug 03, 2001 at 10:51:04AM -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote:
>As long as the remailers themselves are traceable, make no mistake:
> they exist only because the lions have not yet passed a law against them.
>
Of course it would take many -- hundreds -- of jurisdictions acting
in concert to
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Ray Dillinger wrote:
> On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Jim Choate wrote:
>
>
> >But the only place they can trace messages in a 'small world' model is at
> >source/destination link, which means they're already on top of you. If
> >they're out fishing all they'd see is a bunch of packet
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Jim Choate wrote:
>But the only place they can trace messages in a 'small world' model is at
>source/destination link, which means they're already on top of you. If
>they're out fishing all they'd see is a bunch of packets sent between
>remailers with the body encrypted sev
At 5:48 PM -0700 8/3/01, Ray Dillinger wrote:
>If the law wants to take this thing down, they will not be
>attacking the strongest point -- ie, trying to trace individual
>messages.
>
>Instead, they will attack the weakest point -- trying to drive
>remailer operators out of business and thus des
Ray Dillinger wrote:
>
> On Fri, 3 Aug 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> >I like the idea of making a remailer part of a worm but it might be just
> >as well to make it an inherent part of a product since people will
> >attempt to eradicate a worm.
>
> And succeed. How many copies of "melissa"
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