At 11:32 AM 04/03/2003 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote:
Ah yes, I haven't updated my timings for the new machines that are faster
than my 550Mhz. :-)
The only other item is importance is that the exhaustive search time isn't
the time to reverse one IP, but the time to reverse all the IPs that have
been r
Bill Frantz wrote:
At 6:16 PM -0800 4/2/03, Seth David Schoen wrote:
Bill Frantz writes:
The http://cryptome.org/usage-logs.htm URL says:
Low resolution data in most cases is intended to be sufficient for
marketing analyses. It may take the form of IP addresses that have been
subjected to a o
Could this not use most of the code from the Onion Router itself. I am
assuming that the code was made freely available and someone has a copy if
it?
-- roop
On Thu, 3 Apr 2003, Ben Laurie wrote:
> Ben.
>
> [1] FWIW, I'd be willing to work on that, but n
At 6:16 PM -0800 4/2/03, Seth David Schoen wrote:
>Bill Frantz writes:
>
>> The http://cryptome.org/usage-logs.htm URL says:
>>
>> >Low resolution data in most cases is intended to be sufficient for
>> >marketing analyses. It may take the form of IP addresses that have been
>> >subjected to a one
Quoting Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> It seems to me if you want to make serious inroads into privacy w.r.t.
> logging of traffic, then what you want to put your energy into is onion
> routing. There is _still_ no deployable free software to do it, and that
> is ridiculous[1]. It seems to m
At 01:05 AM 4/3/2003 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
> Relying on httpd operators to protect those who access is plain silly,
> even if echelon (funny how that word dropped below radar lately) did
> not exist.
Echelon could be grouped together with Carnivore and CALEA devices into
the group of Generi
John Young wrote:
Ben,
Would you care to comment for publication on web logging
described in these two files:
http://cryptome.org/no-logs.htm
http://cryptome.org/usage-logs.htm
Cryptome invites comments from others who know the capabilities
of servers to log or not, and other means for pr
Bill Frantz writes:
> The http://cryptome.org/usage-logs.htm URL says:
>
> >Low resolution data in most cases is intended to be sufficient for
> >marketing analyses. It may take the form of IP addresses that have been
> >subjected to a one way hash, to refer URLs that exclude information other
>
> Relying on httpd operators to protect those who access is plain silly,
> even if echelon (funny how that word dropped below radar lately) did
> not exist.
Echelon could be grouped together with Carnivore and CALEA devices into
the group of Generic Transport-level Eavesdroppers. No need to consid
Ben,
Would you care to comment for publication on web logging
described in these two files:
http://cryptome.org/no-logs.htm
http://cryptome.org/usage-logs.htm
Cryptome invites comments from others who know the capabilities
of servers to log or not, and other means for protecting user priv
Frankly, it seems that some brains around here are softening. Relying on httpd
operators to protect those who access is plain silly, even if echelon (funny
how that word dropped below radar lately) did not exist.
The proper way is, of course, self-protection. Start with tight control of
outgoing i
At 2:58 PM -0800 4/2/03, John Young wrote:
>Ben,
>
>Would you care to comment for publication on web logging
>described in these two files:
>
> http://cryptome.org/no-logs.htm
>
> http://cryptome.org/usage-logs.htm
>
>Cryptome invites comments from others who know the capabilities
>of servers to
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