At 11:35 AM 4/17/2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
Adoption of anonymous e-money is to great degree hindered by the lack of
infrastructure to convert this currency to/from "meatspace" money.
However, there is possible a method, using offshore gambling companies.
You're trying too hard.
Gambling has alwa
While I agree with much of what you say I don't think it's likely that any
kind of advanced SIGINT operation was what brought him down. The most important thing
to have is intelligence from humans. From insiders. This is partly the problem with
the intelligence agencies today. They think
There's a good possibility that Saddam was traced by Tempest
sensing, airborne or mundane. The technology is far more sensitive
than a decade ago. And with a lot of snooping technology kept obscure
by tales of HUMINT, finks, lost laptops and black bag jobs.
For less sensitive compromising emanati
On Dec 14, 2003, at 8:33 PM, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
TEMPEST shielding is fairly esoteric (at least for non-EM-specialists)
field. But potentially could be made easier by simplifying the problem.
If we won't want to shield the user interface (eg. we want just a
cryptographic processor), we may put
> Thomas Shadduck writes:
- cute :) Though I am more often called Shaddup.
> > The problem that makes me feel uneasy about SSL is the vulnerability of
> > the certification authorities when they get compromised, everything
> > they signed gets compromised too.
>
> Technically th
Thomas Shadduck writes:
> The problem that makes me feel uneasy about SSL is the vulnerability of
> the certification authorities when they get compromised, everything
> they signed gets compromised too.
Technically this is true, but the only thing that the CA signs is
other keys. So it merely me
Moin,
Am Sat, 22 Nov 2003 14:54:39 +0100 (CET) schrieb Thomas Shaddack:
> A trick with HTML (or SGML in general) tag and a comment, a browser
> plugin(or manual operation over saved source), and a GPG signature
> over part of the HTML file should do the job, with maintaining full
> backward compa
There is a problem with images and other inline objects. There is a
solution, too.
The objects included into the document can get their hash calculated and
included in their tag; eg,
The tag has to be in the signed part of the document, so the hash can't be
tampered with.
Full digital signatures
And what is the purpose of connecting the key and data storage in the first
place ?
Data storage is data storage, concealed or not. You feed encrypted data to/from
it.
Key is required at human interface and has absolutely nothing to do with the
storage.
If you want better security than passphras
At 05:04 PM 8/11/03 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
> This unit has to be cheap and expendable - it's easy to
>locate and to destroy by a HARM missile. As a bonus, forcing the
adversary
>to waste a $250,000+ AGM-88 missile on a sub-$100 transmitter may be
quite
>demoralizing.
Microwave ovens were us
> As an active twist, we can also use a separate unit, Illuminating
> Transceiver (IT), periodically broadcasting a pulse of known
> characteristics, easy to recognize by the LPs when it bounces from an
> aerial target. This unit has to be cheap and expendable - it's easy to
> locate and to destroy
* Len Sassaman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2003-03-22 18:52]:
> On Sat, 22 Mar 2003, Eric Murray wrote:
>
> It's been a while since I really worked on the Install script -- Mixmaster
> 3.0 doesn't use it -- but this looks to be to be a bug that existed and
> was fixed sometime around a year ago. What ver
On Sat, 22 Mar 2003, Eric Murray wrote:
> >Looking for libcrypto.a...
> >Found at /usr/local/ssl/lib/libcrypto.a.
> >./Install: [: 90701f: integer expression expected
>
> I think that line means that mixmaster's install script isn't
> properly identifying the version of Openssl. If it
On Sat, 22 Mar 2003, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> IDEA is listed on the fourth line, so it seems IDEA was installed with
> OpenSSL, but MixMaster's install may be improperly detecting that IDEA
> is absent. It's when I run the Mixmaster install that I get the
> error:
>
>...
>Looking for l
On Sat, 22 Mar 2003, Eric Murray wrote:
> I think that line means that mixmaster's install script isn't
> properly identifying the version of Openssl. If it were
> me, I'd fix the Mixmaster install script.
The install script needs to die. I think nobody argues that point.
> BTW, if you will be
On Sat, Mar 22, 2003 at 09:40:50AM +, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> IDEA is listed on the fourth line, so it seems IDEA was installed with
> OpenSSL, but MixMaster's install may be improperly detecting that IDEA
> is absent. It's when I run the Mixmaster install that I get the
> error:
>
>
* Lucky Green <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2003-03-22 09:13]:
>
> Do a Google search for IDEA and the name of your OS or distribution to
> find out how to recompile with IDEA support enabled.
I might need my hand held on this one. I did an exhausting search
before posting. Part if the problem is that '
Mindfuq wrote:
> I compiling the Mixmaster remailer, I get an error the
> OpenSSL was not compiled with IDEA support. However, OpenSSL
> was supposed to have compiled with IDEA out of the box, with
> only an option to disable it. What am I missing?
You in all likelihood fell victim to some mis
At 10:05 AM 3/18/2003 -0500, you wrote:
I think you're on to something here.
One quick thought that occurs to me is that for some of the gain, I see no
reason forward error correction couldn't be used within the IP payload, at
least for a few dB of gain (has this been tried?)
Both coding (e.g.,
the FEC, but it might be possible for that to look just
like good old Ethernet shared-bandwidth-based conjestion (but I'm no IP guy
so I could be talkin' out my arse here).
-TD
From: Steve Schear <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Tyler Durden" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: [E
On Mon, Mar 17, 2003 at 03:13:46PM +0100, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
> Using a powerful high-frequency modulated infrared source (eg, a bank of
> LEDs) located on a highly visible place, it couldbe possible to facilitate
> local community broadcasts, effectively sidestepping all FCC regulations.
Hi,
Another possibility occurred to me. It might be possible to use the
802.11-like devices for this purpose. The problem for this application
with Wi-Fi is its focus on high data rate and therefore low process
gain. But there is no inherent reason why almost the same circuits
(perhaps even the
At 03:13 PM 3/17/2003 +0100, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
Using a powerful high-frequency modulated infrared source (eg, a bank of
LEDs) located on a highly visible place, it couldbe possible to facilitate
local community broadcasts, effectively sidestepping all FCC regulations.
Better to ignore low powe
snow are
apparently fine).
-TD
From: Steve Schear <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Thomas Shaddack <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, cypherpunks
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Idea: Sidestepping low-power broadcast regulations with
infrared
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2003 08:40:05 -0800
At 03:1
Steve Schear wrote...
I haven't checked but assume they should be relatively cheap. For example,
I'm assuming this device isn't too expensive and the sensor itself should
be available for a few $10s. http://www.ame-corp.com/UVB.htm
Perhaps I misunderstand what you would want to use this device
At 12:08 PM 3/17/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Steve Schear wrote...
"A detector that is only sensitive to this spectral region has the
capability to operate in the daylight, even while pointing at the sun, and
pick up little background radiation"
How much are UV receivers (note, not the same thing as
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