On 2005-02-04T23:28:56+0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 04, 2005 at 08:21:47PM +, Justin wrote:
>
> > They managed with the HTDV broadcast flag mandate.
>
> If I film off a HDTV screen with a HDTV camera (or just do single-frame
> with a good professional camera) will the flag be preser
--
On 3 Feb 2005 at 22:25, Anonymous wrote:
> Now, my personal perspective on this is that this is no real
> threat. It allows people who choose to use the capability to
> issue reasonably credible and convincing statements about
> their software configuration. Basically it allows people to
> t
On Fri, 2005-02-04 at 19:07 -0800, James A. Donald wrote:
> The ability to convincingly tell the truth is a very handy one
> between people who are roughly equal. It is a potentially
> disastrous one if one party can do violence with impunity to
> the one with the ability to convincingly tell the
On 2005-02-03T22:25:28+0100, Anonymous wrote:
> The only people endangered by this capability are those who want to be
> able to lie. They want to agree to contracts and user agreements that,
> for example, require them to observe DRM restrictions and copyright
> laws, but then they want the power
Eric Murray writes:
> The TCPA chip verifies the (signature on the) BIOS and the OS.
> So the software driver is the one that's trusted by the TCPA chip.
I don't believe this is correct. The TPM does not verify any signatures.
It is fundamentally a passive chip. Its only job is to store hashes
o
As far as the question of malware exploiting TC, it's difficult to
evaulate without knowing more details about how the technology ends up
being used.
First there was TCPA, which is now called TCG. Microsoft spun off their
own version called Palladium, then NGSCB. But then Microsoft withdrew
NGSC
On Fri, Feb 04, 2005 at 08:21:47PM +, Justin wrote:
> They managed with the HTDV broadcast flag mandate.
If I film off a HDTV screen with a HDTV camera (or just do single-frame with
a good professional camera) will the flag be preserved?
Watermarks will, but that's the next mass genocide by
On Sat, Feb 05, 2005 at 11:23:14AM +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> > The point is that HDTV is a popular consumer technology, and the MPAA
> > and TV networks alone managed to hijack it.
>
> I have yet to see a single HDTV movie/broadcast, and I understand most TV
> sets can't display anything beyond
On Sat, Feb 05, 2005 at 01:19:46AM +, Justin wrote:
> > If I film off a HDTV screen with a HDTV camera (or just do single-frame
> > with a good professional camera) will the flag be preserved?
>
> I don't think so, I think the flag is in the bitstream and doesn't
> affect visual output at all
On 2005-02-04T14:30:48-0500, Mark Allen Earnest wrote:
> The government was not able to get the Clipper chip passed and that was
> backed with the horror stories of rampant pedophilia, terrorism, and
> organized crime. Do you honestly believe they will be able to destroy
> open source, linux, in
On Thu, 3 Feb 2005, Erwann ABALEA wrote:
> And do you seriously think that "you can't do that, it's technically not
> possible" is a good answer? That's what you're saying. For me, a better
> answer is "you don't have the right to deny my ownership".
Yes, Senator McCarthy, I do in fact feel safer
Ed Reed wrote:
I'm just curious on this point. I haven't seen much
to indicate that Microsoft and others are ready
for a nymous, tradeable software assets world.
No, and neither are corporate customers, to a large extent.
Right, so my point (I think) was that without some
indication that t
Trei, Peter wrote:
It could easily be leveraged to make motherboards
which will only run 'authorized' OSs, and OSs
which will run only 'authorized' software.
And you, the owner of the computer, will NOT
neccesarily be the authority which gets to decide
what OS and software the machine can run.
If y
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Dan Kaminsky writes:
>
>>>Uh, you *really* have no idea how much the black hat community is
>>>looking forward to TCPA. For example, Office is going to have core
>>>components running inside a protected environment totally immune to
>>>antivirus.
>>>
>>>
>>
>>Ho
The best that can happen with TCPA is pretty good -
it could stop a lot of viruses and malware, for one
thing.
No, it can't. That's the point; it's not like the code running inside
the sandbox becomes magically exploitproof...it just becomes totally
opaque to any external auditor. A black h
Peter Gutmann wrote:
Neither. Currently they've typically been smart-card cores glued to the
MB and accessed via I2C/SMB.
and chips that typically have had eal4+ or eal5+ evaluations. hot topic
in 2000, 2001 ... at the intel developer's forums and rsa conferences
Erwann ABALEA wrote:
> I've read your objections. Maybe I wasn't clear. What's wrong in
installing a cryptographic device by default on PC motherboards?
I work for a PKI 'vendor', and for me, software private keys is a
nonsense. How will you convice "Mr Smith" (or Mme Michu) to buy an
expensive CC
Uh, you *really* have no idea how much the black hat community is
looking forward to TCPA. For example, Office is going to have core
components running inside a protected environment totally immune to
antivirus.
How? TCPA is only a cryptographic device, and some BIOS code, nothing
else. Does
On Thu, Feb 03, 2005 at 11:45:01PM -0600, Shawn K. Quinn wrote:
> Isn't it possible to emulate the TCPA chip in software, using one's own
> RSA key, and thus signing whatever you damn well please with it instead
> of whatever the chip wants to sign? So in reality, as far as remote
> attestation goe
I spent considerable time a couple years ago on these lists arguing
that people should have the right to use this technology if they want.
I also believe that it has potential good uses. But let's be accurate.
> Please stop relaying FUD. You have full control over your PC, even if this
> one is e
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> On Behalf Of Anonymous
> The only people endangered by this capability are those who want to be
> able to lie. They want to agree to contracts and user agreements that,
> for example, require them to observe DRM restrictions and copyright
> la
Erwann ABALEA <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>I've read your objections. Maybe I wasn't clear. What's wrong in installing a
>cryptographic device by default on PC motherboards? I work for a PKI 'vendor',
>and for me, software private keys is a nonsense.
A simple crypto device controlled by the same
- Original Message -
From: "Shawn K. Quinn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Dell to Add Security Chip to PCs
Isn't it possible to emulate the TCPA chip in software, using one's own
RSA key, and thus signing whatever you damn well please with it instead
of
I don't know how clear I can say this, your threat model is broken, and the
bad guys can't stop laughing about it.
Come on, now...who's going to be better at Security than Microsoft? Since
bad guys won't be allowed inside the TCPA world then everything's going to
be just fine.
Seems like the "e
On Thu, 2005-02-03 at 22:25 +0100, Anonymous wrote:
> The manufacturer issues a certificate on the public part of the EK,
> called the PUBEK. This key is then used (in a somewhat roundabout
> manner) to issue signed statements which attest to the software state
> of the machine. These attestation
Erwann ABALEA
> On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Trei, Peter wrote:
>
> > Seeing as it comes out of the TCG, this is almost certainly
> > the enabling hardware for Palladium/NGSCB. Its a part of
> > your computer which you may not have full control over.
>
> Please stop relaying FUD. You have full control
>
On Thu, 3 Feb 2005, Jay Sulzberger wrote:
> On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Erwann ABALEA wrote:
>
> > On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Trei, Peter wrote:
> >
> >> Seeing as it comes out of the TCG, this is almost certainly
> >> the enabling hardware for Palladium/NGSCB. Its a part of
> >> your computer which you may not
EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: Dell to Add Security Chip to PCs
Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2005 17:53:22 +1300
"Tyler Durden" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>That "chip"...is it likely to be an ASIC or is there already such a thing
as
>a security network processor? (ie, a cheaper net
>>> Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 2/2/2005 6:38:46 PM >>>
> I'm just curious on this point. I haven't seen much
> to indicate that Microsoft and others are ready
> for a nymous, tradeable software assets world.
No, and neither are corporate customers, to a large extent.
Accountability is, in fact, a
Bonjour,
On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Erwann ABALEA wrote:
> On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Trei, Peter wrote:
>
> > Seeing as it comes out of the TCG, this is almost certainly
> > the enabling hardware for Palladium/NGSCB. Its a part of
> > your computer which you may not have full control over.
>
> Please stop rel
On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Dan Kaminsky wrote:
> Uh, you *really* have no idea how much the black hat community is
> looking forward to TCPA. For example, Office is going to have core
> components running inside a protected environment totally immune to
> antivirus.
How? TCPA is only a cryptographic de
On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Erwann ABALEA wrote:
On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Trei, Peter wrote:
Seeing as it comes out of the TCG, this is almost certainly
the enabling hardware for Palladium/NGSCB. Its a part of
your computer which you may not have full control over.
Please stop relaying FUD. You have full contr
Uh, you *really* have no idea how much the black hat community is
looking forward to TCPA. For example, Office is going to have core
components running inside a protected environment totally immune to
antivirus. Since these components are going to be managing
cryptographic operations, the "we
Erwann ABALEA wrote:
On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Trei, Peter wrote:
Seeing as it comes out of the TCG, this is almost certainly
the enabling hardware for Palladium/NGSCB. Its a part of
your computer which you may not have full control over.
Please stop relaying FUD. You have full control over your
On Wed, Feb 02, 2005 at 05:30:33PM +0100, Erwann ABALEA wrote:
> Please stop relaying FUD. You have full control over your PC, even if this
Please stop relaying pro-DRM pabulum. The only reason for Nagscab is
restricting the user's rights to his own files.
Of course there are other reasons for h
"Tyler Durden" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>That "chip"...is it likely to be an ASIC or is there already such a thing as
>a security network processor? (ie, a cheaper network processor that only
>handles security apps, etc...)
>
>Or could it be an FPGA?
Neither. Currently they've typically bee
On Wed, Feb 02, 2005 at 12:45:58PM -0500, Steve Thompson wrote:
> Well we all know that having complete control over one's own
> computer is far too dangerous. Obviously, it would be best if
> computers, operating systems, and application software had
> proprietary back-doors that would enable t
On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Trei, Peter wrote:
> Seeing as it comes out of the TCG, this is almost certainly
> the enabling hardware for Palladium/NGSCB. Its a part of
> your computer which you may not have full control over.
Please stop relaying FUD. You have full control over your PC, even if this
one
--- "Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Seeing as it comes out of the TCG, this is almost certainly
> the enabling hardware for Palladium/NGSCB. Its a part of
> your computer which you may not have full control over.
Well we all know that having complete control over one's own
computer is
Seeing as it comes out of the TCG, this is almost certainly
the enabling hardware for Palladium/NGSCB. Its a part of
your computer which you may not have full control over.
Peter Trei
Tyler Durden
> ANyone familiar with computer architectures and chips able to
> answer this
> question:
>
> Th
ANyone familiar with computer architectures and chips able to answer this
question:
That "chip"...is it likely to be an ASIC or is there already such a thing as
a security network processor? (ie, a cheaper network processor that only
handles security apps, etc...)
Or could it be an FPGA?
-TD
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