Re: Using time-domain reflectometry to detect tamper attempts on telecom cables

2003-03-09 Thread Tyler Durden
mery <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> CC: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: Using time-domain reflectometry to detect tamper attempts on telecom cables Date: Sat, 8 Mar 2003 07:39:36 +0100 (CET) >But getting the bits from under the ocean somewhere back to > Fort Meade without being detected mus

Re: Using time-domain reflectometry to detect tamper attempts on telecom cables

2003-03-09 Thread Thomas Shaddack
> But getting the bits from under the ocean somewhere back to > Fort Meade without being detected must be more interesting. Can't they hire their own fiber in the cable, splice it, and feed the preprocessed data in there? > It probably is true that the right wavelength laser will > penatrat

Re: Using time-domain reflectometry to detect tamper attempts on telecom cables

2003-03-08 Thread Major Variola (ret)
At 12:49 PM 3/7/03 -0600, Harmon Seaver wrote: > I'm sure I read about a way to do fiber, or that someone had developed a >device, that only involved removing a bit of the covering, not cutting into the >fiber at all. Evanescent waves. A *lot* easier to 0wn the landing points, and technicians w

Re: Using time-domain reflectometry to detect tamper attempts on telecom cables

2003-03-07 Thread Dave Emery
On Fri, Mar 07, 2003 at 02:38:56PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: > > Undersea, I've heard that NSA uses splices, and that NSA has its own sub > for that purpose. (And the company I used to work for did some work on > undersea NSA optical projects, so I tend to believe the rumors I heard > there.)

Re: Using time-domain reflectometry to detect tamper attempts on telecom cables

2003-03-07 Thread Tyler Durden
I'm sure I read about a way to do fiber, or that someone had developed a device, that only involved removing a bit of the covering, not cutting into the fiber at all. Yes, there is such a device, and I've used one. The only problem with them is that the amount of attenuation that results fro

Re: Using time-domain reflectometry to detect tamper attempts on telecom cables

2003-03-07 Thread Harmon Seaver
On Fri, Mar 07, 2003 at 11:33:32AM -0500, Sunder wrote: > > Not sure what the NSA would do to tap fibers, certainly tempest wouldn't > work - except if there are repeaters nearby - or if they actually cut into > the fibre to splice it. I'm sure I read about a way to do fiber, or that someone h

Using time-domain reflectometry to detect tamper attempts on telecom cables

2003-03-07 Thread Thomas Shaddack
Time to time, usually when it appears on Cryptome, I skim through the revisions of Wassenaar agreement lists of controlled technologies. It's a neat way to keep myself up to date with what technologies are available on the market and the approximate degree of security they offer. One of the contro

Re: Using time-domain reflectometry to detect tamper attempts on telecom cables

2003-03-07 Thread Tyler Durden
Well, I can only speak about OTDRs. Maybe it could be possible to build a dedicated TDR system intended to be connected to installed cablings, periodically test the cables by sending pulses along them and watch what returns, compare the result with long-term average, and report differences. This