Bug#304556: file permissions race in mkdir, mknod, mkfifo (CAN-2005-1039)

2006-08-24 Thread Paul Eggert
This patch doesn't look safe to me. mkfifo and mknod should not open device files or fifos, since this has undesirable side effects in some cases. For example, opening and then closing a tape drive might rewind it. As I wrote in April 2005, the original security issue is not a vulnerability in

Bug#304556: file permissions race in mkdir, mknod, mkfifo (CAN-2005-1039)

2005-04-15 Thread Paul Eggert
My kneejerk reaction is that it's not worth making this change. The attack in question will work against almost any program that is operated in an insecure directory, including the chmod program itself. It'd be a real pain to work around this problem in all applications, one at a time, and it's

Bug#304556: file permissions race in mkdir, mknod, mkfifo (CAN-2005-1039)

2005-04-15 Thread Jim Meyering
Paul Eggert [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My kneejerk reaction is that it's not worth making this change. The attack in question will work against almost any program that is operated in an insecure directory, including the chmod program itself. It'd be a real pain to work around this problem in

Bug#304556: file permissions race in mkdir, mknod, mkfifo (CAN-2005-1039)

2005-04-14 Thread Michael Stone
The problem of root executing things on demand for evil users cannot be solved through technical means. Mike Stone -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Bug#304556: file permissions race in mkdir, mknod, mkfifo (CAN-2005-1039)

2005-04-14 Thread Jim Meyering
Joey Hess [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Package: coreutils Version: 5.2.1-2 Severity: important Tags: security Our coreutils seems to be vulnerable to the problem described in CAN-2005-1039. http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/395489 A quick strace of mkdir -m 400 foo shows the problem:

Bug#304556: file permissions race in mkdir, mknod, mkfifo (CAN-2005-1039)

2005-04-13 Thread Joey Hess
Package: coreutils Version: 5.2.1-2 Severity: important Tags: security Our coreutils seems to be vulnerable to the problem described in CAN-2005-1039. http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/395489 A quick strace of mkdir -m 400 foo shows the problem: mkdir(foo, 0400) = 0

Bug#304556: file permissions race in mkdir, mknod, mkfifo (CAN-2005-1039)

2005-04-13 Thread Michael Stone
severity 304556 normal thanks At most this is normal, probably minor. The -m flag is basically replacing a call to chmod, which has exactly the same problem. Any time you fiddle with permissions or ownership in the filesystem you're opening yourself up to this exact problem--and there's

Bug#304556: file permissions race in mkdir, mknod, mkfifo (CAN-2005-1039)

2005-04-13 Thread Joey Hess
Michael Stone wrote: severity 304556 normal thanks At most this is normal, probably minor. The -m flag is basically replacing a call to chmod, which has exactly the same problem. Any time you fiddle with permissions or ownership in the filesystem you're opening yourself up to this exact

Bug#304556: file permissions race in mkdir, mknod, mkfifo (CAN-2005-1039)

2005-04-13 Thread Michael Stone
On Wed, Apr 13, 2005 at 07:52:34PM -0400, Joey Hess wrote: It's not really clear to me either why people consider this a security hole now after not worrying about this class of problems for years. Generally it means that someone just learned something that people already knew about. reason for it

Bug#304556: file permissions race in mkdir, mknod, mkfifo (CAN-2005-1039)

2005-04-13 Thread Joey Hess
Michael Stone wrote: Generally it means that someone just learned something that people already knew about. I've never heard of this class of vulnerabilities, but I perhaps that just makes me a clueless security noob. Anyway, it was pointed out in a reply to the gzip bug that this kind of hole