Re: Security in a shell that starts ssh

2001-06-13 Thread Daniel Ginsburg
On Wed, Jun 13, 2001 at 10:57:08AM -0500, Steve Greenland wrote: Tim, good fixups, a few C coding/style nitpicks: On 12-Jun-01, 17:57 (CDT), Tim van Erven [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: #include stdio.h #include unistd.h /* For execlp */ #include stdlib.h /* For exit */ int main() int

Re: Security in a shell that starts ssh

2001-06-13 Thread Daniel Ginsburg
On Wed, Jun 13, 2001 at 02:02:10PM -0500, Steve Greenland wrote: [snip] I'd still argue that exit(_macro_) is better style than return from main(), but I'm hard pressed to find a technical argument. There's subtle difference between returning from main and calling exit. Excelent explanation

Re: Security in a shell that starts ssh

2001-06-13 Thread Daniel Ginsburg
On Wed, Jun 13, 2001 at 10:57:08AM -0500, Steve Greenland wrote: Tim, good fixups, a few C coding/style nitpicks: On 12-Jun-01, 17:57 (CDT), Tim van Erven [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: #include stdio.h #include unistd.h /* For execlp */ #include stdlib.h /* For exit */ int main() int

Re: Security in a shell that starts ssh

2001-06-13 Thread Daniel Ginsburg
On Wed, Jun 13, 2001 at 02:02:10PM -0500, Steve Greenland wrote: [snip] I'd still argue that exit(_macro_) is better style than return from main(), but I'm hard pressed to find a technical argument. There's subtle difference between returning from main and calling exit. Excelent explanation

Re: Security in a shell that starts ssh

2001-06-13 Thread Daniel Ginsburg
On Wed, Jun 13, 2001 at 04:10:27PM -0500, Steve Greenland wrote: On 13-Jun-01, 13:47 (CDT), Tim van Erven [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Wed, Jun 13, 2001 at 10:57:08AM -0500, Steve Greenland wrote: int main() int main(void) /* () != (void) in C */ The comp.lang.c faq

Re: Security in a shell that starts ssh

2001-06-13 Thread Daniel Ginsburg
On Wed, Jun 13, 2001 at 11:34:28PM +0200, Tim van Erven wrote: [snip] Possible access to unallocated memory if \0\n supplied as input. Only if strlen(name) = 0 and besides from being hard to achieve when entering data on stdin, fgets will return 0 if that happens. But not if

Re: Debian audititing tool?

2000-12-26 Thread Daniel Ginsburg
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 09:27:53PM +0200, Pavel Minev Penev wrote: On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 05:27:07PM +0300, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Of course plain md5 hashes are not very helpful. But we can keep MAC[1] for binaries. Tampering with MAC database is useless. ... [1] Message

Re: Debian audititing tool?

2000-12-26 Thread Daniel Ginsburg
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 09:27:53PM +0200, Pavel Minev Penev wrote: On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 05:27:07PM +0300, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Of course plain md5 hashes are not very helpful. But we can keep MAC[1] for binaries. Tampering with MAC database is useless. ... [1] Message

Re: Debian audititing tool?

2000-12-26 Thread Daniel Ginsburg
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 10:52:47PM +0100, Christian Kurz wrote: On 00-12-26 Peter Cordes wrote: have produced collisions in MD5. This is a Bad Thing for MD5, but it isn't a real break against MD5. It means that you can find two messages that hash to the same value. To do so, you _have_