Re: Mozilla/Firefox "PostScript/default" security problems

2004-07-10 Thread Reid Priedhorsky
On Sat, 10 Jul 2004 12:00:07 +0200, Dale Amon wrote: > > I'd like a black and white clarification of the impact > of the change so I know for certain whether to be > incredibly pissed off at the packager or not: > > "If I were to dselect today, would I still >be able to print to fil

Re: Mozilla/Firefox "PostScript/default" security problems

2004-07-10 Thread Carl Fink
Has anyone invited our Mozilla packager to participate in this discussion? -- Carl Fink [EMAIL PROTECTED] Jabootu's Minister of Proofreading http://www.jabootu.com -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTE

Re: Mozilla/Firefox "PostScript/default" security problems

2004-07-10 Thread Florian Weimer
* Don Armstrong: > Perhaps I've missed something, but everything that I've read in the > threads so far amounts to people either assuming that there's an issue > and not defining it, or attempting to figure out where the issue is. This summary is correct as far as I can see. No real security iss

Re: Mozilla/Firefox "PostScript/default" security problems

2004-07-10 Thread Don Armstrong
On Sat, 10 Jul 2004, Michael B Allen wrote: > My impression was that the PostScript generator had the security > issue Can someone please state, for the record, definitively and precisely what this "security issue" is? The fact that PS is a turing complete language isn't a security issue, beyond

Re: Mozilla/Firefox "PostScript/default" security problems

2004-07-10 Thread Michael B Allen
On Sat, 10 Jul 2004 11:19:03 -0400 Greg Folkert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Excuse the cross posting, but many are "discussing" on all of these > lists. > > On Sat, 2004-07-10 at 06:47, Magnus Therning wrote: > > > > > > "If I were to dselect today, would I still > > >be able to print to f

Re: Mozilla/Firefox "PostScript/default" security problems

2004-07-10 Thread Brad Sims
On Saturday 10 July 2004 5:47 am, Magnus Therning wrote: > >I'd like a black and white clarification of the impact > >of the change so I know for certain whether to be > >incredibly pissed off at the packager or not: > > > >   "If I were to dselect today, would I still > >    be able to pr

Re: Mozilla/Firefox "PostScript/default" security problems

2004-07-10 Thread Greg Folkert
Excuse the cross posting, but many are "discussing" on all of these lists. On Sat, 2004-07-10 at 06:47, Magnus Therning wrote: > > > > "If I were to dselect today, would I still > > be able to print to file a website page > > as ps?" [Y/N] > > Yes. Printing PS to a file is still p

Re: Mozilla/Firefox "PostScript/default" security problems

2004-07-10 Thread Dale Amon
On Sat, Jul 10, 2004 at 12:47:18PM +0200, Magnus Therning wrote: > Yes. Printing PS to a file is still possible. Thanks. I had visions of all sorts of extra work in order to just stand still. Now I can forget about this and go back to writing my mail address verify daemon... --

Re: Mozilla/Firefox "PostScript/default" security problems

2004-07-10 Thread Magnus Therning
On Sat, Jul 10, 2004 at 10:47:08AM +0100, Dale Amon wrote: >On Fri, Jul 09, 2004 at 06:38:49PM -0500, Brad Sims wrote: >> If you want postscript back; simply grab the source deb and roll your own; >> just edit rules under the debian folder. Delete the '--with-xprint' and >> '--disable-postscript'

Re: Mozilla/Firefox "PostScript/default" security problems

2004-07-10 Thread Dale Amon
On Fri, Jul 09, 2004 at 06:38:49PM -0500, Brad Sims wrote: > If you want postscript back; simply grab the source deb and roll your own; > just edit rules under the debian folder. Delete the '--with-xprint' and > '--disable-postscript' lines and do 'dpkg-buildpackage -rfakeroot'. However > I did g

Re: Mozilla/Firefox "PostScript/default" security problems

2004-07-09 Thread Brad Sims
On Thursday 08 July 2004 7:18 pm, Reid Priedhorsky wrote: > Googling and searching the bug database only yielded a vague claim about a > remote exploit (bug #247585). I also asked over on debian-user and while > the flurry of replies showed that the removal decision was controversial > if not unpo

Mozilla/Firefox "PostScript/default" security problems

2004-07-08 Thread Reid Priedhorsky
Hello all, I have just discovered that the old-style printing option "PostScript/default" is gone from Firefox and probably Mozilla (I don't use Mozilla). Apparently a major reason for this is that the PostScript printing engine that was removed has security problems. Does anyone have any solid r

Re: default security

2002-03-13 Thread martin f krafft
also sprach Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2002.03.07.1054 +0100]: > > > Debian could provide, with only some effort from package > > > maintainers versions of daemons chrooted to given environments. This > > > however, might break Policy (IMHO). > > > > how would it break

Re: default security

2002-03-13 Thread martin f krafft
also sprach Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2002.03.07.1054 +0100]: > > > Debian could provide, with only some effort from package > > > maintainers versions of daemons chrooted to given environments. This > > > however, might break Policy (IMHO). > > > > how would it break

Re: default security

2002-03-07 Thread Xeno Campanoli
Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña wrote: > > On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 01:51:32PM +0100, martin f krafft wrote: > > > > > Debian could provide, with only some effort from package > > > maintainers versions of daemons chrooted to given environments. This > > > however, might break Policy (IMHO). > >

Re: default security

2002-03-07 Thread Xeno Campanoli
Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña wrote: > > On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 01:51:32PM +0100, martin f krafft wrote: > > > > > Debian could provide, with only some effort from package > > > maintainers versions of daemons chrooted to given environments. This > > > however, might break Policy (IMHO). >

Re: default security

2002-03-07 Thread Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 01:51:32PM +0100, martin f krafft wrote: > > > Debian could provide, with only some effort from package > > maintainers versions of daemons chrooted to given environments. This > > however, might break Policy (IMHO). > > how would it break policy? (sorry, catching up

Re: default security

2002-03-07 Thread Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 01:51:32PM +0100, martin f krafft wrote: > > > Debian could provide, with only some effort from package > > maintainers versions of daemons chrooted to given environments. This > > however, might break Policy (IMHO). > > how would it break policy? (sorry, catching up

Re: default security

2002-01-16 Thread Michael Wood
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 01:16:12PM +0100, Javier Fern?ndez-Sanguino Pe?a wrote: > On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 10:21:00AM +0100, Tarjei wrote: [snip] > > Debian being what it is, are there any reasons why the > > debian bind package should not be chroot as the default > > instalation? > > RTFM. T

Re: default security

2002-01-15 Thread Michael Wood
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 01:16:12PM +0100, Javier Fern?ndez-Sanguino Pe?a wrote: > On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 10:21:00AM +0100, Tarjei wrote: [snip] > > Debian being what it is, are there any reasons why the > > debian bind package should not be chroot as the default > > instalation? > > RTFM.

Re: default security

2002-01-15 Thread Tim Haynes
Tarjei <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Hmm. Here's a suggestion. > > - This idea is based on the asumtion that espesially serversystems need > good security. *All* installed boxes need adequate securing. Linux worms would not propagate if it weren't for a critical mass of idiots running unpatched d

Re: default security

2002-01-15 Thread Tarjei
Hmm. Here's a suggestion. - This idea is based on the asumtion that espesially serversystems need good security. 1. Make a votingpage and anounce it on debian-users asking what are the main servers people are running on their debian systems. 2. Go through the 10 highest and make sure they

Re: default security

2002-01-15 Thread martin f krafft
also sprach Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2002.01.15.1316 +0100]: > > Debian being what it is, are there any reasons why the debian bind > > package should not be chroot as the default instalation? > > RTFM. That is: > http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian

Re: default security

2002-01-15 Thread Tim Haynes
Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 10:21:00AM +0100, Tarjei wrote: > > > >> > >> >I recall there being discussion a while back about packaging chroot >> >bind. I don't know whether or not anything came of it at all. There is >> > >> Debian being

Re: default security

2002-01-15 Thread Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 10:21:00AM +0100, Tarjei wrote: > > > > > >I recall there being discussion a while back about packaging chroot > >bind. I don't know whether or not anything came of it at all. There is > > > Debian being what it is, are there any reasons why the debian bind > package shou

Re: default security

2002-01-15 Thread Tim Haynes
Tarjei <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Hmm. Here's a suggestion. > > - This idea is based on the asumtion that espesially serversystems need > good security. *All* installed boxes need adequate securing. Linux worms would not propagate if it weren't for a critical mass of idiots running unpatched

Re: default security

2002-01-15 Thread Tarjei
Hmm. Here's a suggestion. - This idea is based on the asumtion that espesially serversystems need good security. 1. Make a votingpage and anounce it on debian-users asking what are the main servers people are running on their debian systems. 2. Go through the 10 highest and make sure they fo

Re: default security

2002-01-15 Thread martin f krafft
also sprach Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2002.01.15.1316 +0100]: > > Debian being what it is, are there any reasons why the debian bind > > package should not be chroot as the default instalation? > > RTFM. That is: > >http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debi

Re: default security

2002-01-15 Thread Tim Haynes
Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 10:21:00AM +0100, Tarjei wrote: > > > >> > >> >I recall there being discussion a while back about packaging chroot >> >bind. I don't know whether or not anything came of it at all. There is >> > >> Debian being

Re: default security

2002-01-15 Thread Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 10:21:00AM +0100, Tarjei wrote: > > > > > >I recall there being discussion a while back about packaging chroot > >bind. I don't know whether or not anything came of it at all. There is > > > Debian being what it is, are there any reasons why the debian bind > package sho

Re: default security

2002-01-15 Thread Jon Kent
I'd agree with your comments. I being looking at OpenBSD (for various reasons) and the default setup is reasonable secure (there are still some things left on , which supprised me). Not sure if Debian needs to go as far as OpenBSD but I think that it is a good referance base Jon --- Tarjei <[EM

default security

2002-01-15 Thread Tarjei
I recall there being discussion a while back about packaging chroot bind. I don't know whether or not anything came of it at all. There is Debian being what it is, are there any reasons why the debian bind package should not be chroot as the default instalation? One thing that might be a g

Re: default security

2002-01-15 Thread Jon Kent
I'd agree with your comments. I being looking at OpenBSD (for various reasons) and the default setup is reasonable secure (there are still some things left on , which supprised me). Not sure if Debian needs to go as far as OpenBSD but I think that it is a good referance base Jon --- Tarjei <[E

default security

2002-01-15 Thread Tarjei
> > >I recall there being discussion a while back about packaging chroot >bind. I don't know whether or not anything came of it at all. There is > Debian being what it is, are there any reasons why the debian bind package should not be chroot as the default instalation? One thing that might be