On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 02:59:48PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> From a voting nerd point-of-view, we're not really running a simple
> Condorcet vote here, we're actually running two votes simultaneously. One
> is an approval vote, where we mark every non-default option as either
> approved or not-
> > The reason is that condorcet has this "problem",
> > even with no quorums whatsoever. Martin Schulze's post
> > http://lists.debian.org/debian-vote/2003/debian-vote-200305/msg00119.html
> > illustrates this principal.
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 11:39:06PM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
> Huh? Plain
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 03:50:59PM -0400, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:46:13PM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
> > In my example local quorum causes the following problem:
> > dropping an irrelevant option changes which
> > relevant option wins the election.
> > Global quorum does not
> Anthony Towns wrote (25 May 2003):
> > C fails to reach its majority requirement and is dropped.
> > B and A are the only remaining options, and B defeats A.
> > B wins.
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 08:20:11PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
> That's strange! The majority requirement makes the default
>
Dear Anthony,
I wrote (25 May 2003):
>37 ACB
>32 BAC
>28 CBA
>03 CAB
>A:B=40:60
>A:C=69:31
>B:C=32:68
>Default option: A.
>Quorum: 30.
>B meets quorum.
>C meets quorum.
>Manoj's May 15 proposal would choose A.
You wrote (25 May 2003):
> C fails to r
> you wrote (25 May 2003):
> > On the other hand, if you could show that the May 15 mechanism
> > violates monotonicity, then I'd be opposed to it.
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 06:21:13PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
> Situation 1:
>Default option: A,Quorum: 30.
>40 ACB,32 BAC,28 CB
> >A:C=69:31
> >Default option: A.
> >Quorum: 30.
On Mon, May 26, 2003 at 03:18:44AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> C fails to reach its majority requirement and is dropped.
Huh?
--
Raul
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 06:21:13PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
>37 ACB
>32 BAC
>28 CBA
>03 CAB
>A:B=40:60
>A:C=69:31
>B:C=32:68
>Default option: A.
>Quorum: 30.
>B meets quorum.
>C meets quorum.
C fails to reach its majority requirement and is dropped.
On Sat, May 24, 2003 at 07:27:53PM -0400, Nathanael Nerode wrote:
> Here's the nightmare scenario, under Manoj's amendment, which I think
> John Robinson may have been trying to come up with. Consider two options,
> A and B, and the default option D. Let the quorum requirement R=20.
> 39 people
Dear Raul,
you wrote (25 May 2003):
> On the other hand, if you could show that the May 15 mechanism
> violates monotonicity, then I'd be opposed to it.
Situation 1:
40 ACB
32 BAC
28 CBA
A:B=40:60
A:C=72:28
B:C=32:68
Default option: A.
Quorum: 30.
B meets quorum.
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 04:04:59PM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
> in our constitution I read (about Quorum)
> Q is half of the square root of the number of current Developers.
Note that quorum is 3Q, not Q.
> Does anybody remember the reason for choosing half the square root?
> Why not just, let
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 04:04:59PM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
> in our constitution I read (about Quorum)
>
> Q is half of the square root of the number of current Developers.
>
> Does anybody remember the reason for choosing half the square root?
> Why not just, let's say, 10% of the develope
Hello,
in our constitution I read (about Quorum)
Q is half of the square root of the number of current Developers.
Does anybody remember the reason for choosing half the square root?
Why not just, let's say, 10% of the developers? Or is the rationale
for this lost in time?
Thank you,
Joche
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 03:34:32PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
> here is a simpler example.
>
>8 ABC
>7 BCA
>5 CAB
>
>A:B=13:07
>A:C=08:12
>B:C=15:05
>
>Suppose, that the quorum is 10 and the default
>option is A. Then the winner according to
>Manoj's May 15
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 02:50:55PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
> There is only one election. In this election, 38 voters prefer E to C,
> 42 voters prefer D to E and 24 voters prefer D to C. Manoj's May 15
> proposal would choose candidate E. My proposal would choose candidate D.
>
> But --and th
Dear Raul,
here is a simpler example.
8 ABC
7 BCA
5 CAB
A:B=13:07
A:C=08:12
B:C=15:05
Suppose, that the quorum is 10 and the default
option is A. Then the winner according to
Manoj's May 15 proposal is C.
If there was a second election and the voters don't
chan
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 02:50:55PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
> But --and this is what I have to criticize-- _if there was a second election_
> then (simply because of the fact that in the first election the default
> option has been changed from candidate C to candidate E)
Uh, no: if there wer
Dear Raul,
I wrote (25 May 2003):
> There is only one election.
You wrote (25 May 2003):
> This seems to contradict what you said in your 5/24 message:
>
>Manoj's May 15 proposal would choose candidate E. In the next
>elections, when candidate E is the default option, Manoj's
>May 15
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 11:52:46AM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
> There is only one election.
This seems to contradict what you said in your 5/24 message:
Manoj's May 15 proposal would choose candidate E. In the next
elections, when candidate E is the default option, Manoj's
May 15 propo
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 11:52:46AM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
> As far as I have understood Manoj's May 15 proposal
> correctly, A defeats D by 31 in your example.
...
It looks like I understood you to be using that term (and, from the
balance of your message at least one other term) differently
Dear Raul,
you wrote (25 May 2003):
> Quorum of 10, ballot A, default (D), votes:
>
> 31 A D
> 28 D A
>
> Here, A does not defeat D by 10, but still satisfies
> the quorum requirement.
As far as I have understood Manoj's May 15 proposal
correctly, A defeats D by 31 in your example.
**
I wro
Dear Nathanael,
Raul Miller wrote (25 May 2003):
> Correct me if I'm wrong, but: what Manoj's May 15 proposal
> implements logically equivalent to your suggestion?
I wrote (25 May 2003):
> As far as I have understood Manoj's May 15 proposal correctly,
> an option is dropped unless it _directly_ d
On Sat, May 24, 2003 at 09:24:34PM -0400, Nathanael Nerode wrote:
> Consider if all the people who, in my original example, ranked A=D,
> instead ranked A *below* D.
> 19x ADB
> 19x ABD
> 1x BDA
>
> A vs. B
> 38 to 1
>
> D vs. A
> 20 to 19
Huh? YM A vs D: 38:1.
> B vs. D
> 20 to 19
>
> There's
On Sat, May 24, 2003 at 10:25:38PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
> Raul Miller wrote:
> > What Anthony is trying to point out, and what you're pretending to
> > ignore, is that what "D wins" means is "no one wins, and the vote
> > is thrown out".
> no, this is not the same. one is a legitimate
On Sat, May 24, 2003 at 07:27:53PM -0400, Nathanael Nerode wrote:
> 19x A=DB
> 19x ABD
> 1x BA=D
>
> [...] and B wins (20 to 19).
> Now, with such a low vote, it may seem reasonable for the default option
> to win. But it's certainly not reasonable for B to win.
Why not, exactly? A clear majo
Raul Miller wrote:
>
> What Anthony is trying to point out, and what you're pretending to
> ignore, is that what "D wins" means is "no one wins, and the vote
> is thrown out".
no, this is not the same. one is a legitimate, binding vote with a real
bona fide winner. the other is a nullification.
On Sat, May 24, 2003 at 07:54:44PM -0400, Nathanael Nerode wrote:
> >"breaking" Condorcet isn't a meaningful thing to say. Adding quorum and
> I think we all understand it to mean "causing the system to violate the
> Condorcet criterion".
That's fine, but that doesn't necessarily make the system
On Sat, May 24, 2003 at 09:48:36PM -0400, Nathanael Nerode wrote:
> Raul Miller said:
> >Which makes at least some sense: only 19 people actively approved of A,
> >while 20 actively approved of B. Granted, this mechanism only kicks in
> >for votes with very low turnout or where significant numbers
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