Alexis,
Do you a have a small file which shows this behaviour and could be used
for testing? Even better would be a function which would generate a test
file. This could be included in the mod_python unit tests.
Jim
Alexis Marrero wrote:
All,
The current 3.1 mod_python implementation of
Hi guys,
In the pure if it ain't tested, it ain't fixed fashion, I've added a
unit test for file upload to the test suite. It uploads a randomly
generated 1 MB file to the server, and check that the MD5 digest
returned by the server is correct. I could not reproduce Alexis' bug
report this way,
OK, it looks like Alexis' fix solves the problem with ugh.pdf without
breaking the other unit tests. So I think we can safely integrate his
patch. Shall I do it ?
Regards,
Nicolas2005/11/6, Nicolas Lehuen [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Hi guys,
In the pure if it ain't tested, it ain't fixed fashion, I've
Nicolas,Not that I'm the one to give permission whether to integrate things or not, but just to let you know I don't even have svn installed so I won't do it. At least not for a while...BTW, if there are some cherrypy developers in this mailing list, the CherryPy function that handles file uploads
I've been spending some quality time with hexedit, vim and a little bit
of python. I can now generate a file which can be used in the unit test.
The problem seems to occur when a '\r' character is right at
readBlockSize boundary, which is 65368 in the current mod_python.util.
I have not yet
Gregory (Grisha) Trubetskoy wrote:
So I guess this means we roll and vote on a 3.2.5b?
As much as it pains me to say it, but yes, this is a must fixm so it's
on to 3.2.5b.
I think we need to do some more extensive testing on Alexis's fix before
we roll 3.2.5b. His read_to_boundary is
[ http://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MODPYTHON-40?page=all ]
Nicolas Lehuen reopened MODPYTHON-40:
-
The fix has a bug - see
http://www.modpython.org/pipermail/mod_python/2005-November/019468.html and the
python-dev mailing list (GMane archive
On 11/5/05, Marc Stern [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It's a bit more complex than that.
At a certain point, a fix was released for IE 6 to correct the
incompatibility that needed the 'ssl-unclean-shutdown' directive (I guess
it's KB 831167). At this point, we had two different flavours of IE+SSL
Function 'lookup_builtin_method' in '\modules\http' seems to be optimized
for speed.
However, looking deeper into it, a few more CPU cycles can be saved.
In case 6, we have :
___
case 6:
switch (method[0])
{
case 'U':
Nick Kew wrote:
Why would anyone have to do that? I'll trust a server as much as I trust
the PGP key of the person who signed it. That's the same as trusting
an httpd download because it's signed by someone whose key I trust.
The question then is who is going to sign? You seem to be
+---+
| Bugzilla Bug ID |
| +-+
| | Status: UNC=Unconfirmed NEW=New ASS=Assigned
+---+
| Bugzilla Bug ID |
| +-+
| | Status: UNC=Unconfirmed NEW=New ASS=Assigned
On Sunday 06 November 2005 21:41, Phillip Susi wrote:
Nick Kew wrote:
Why would anyone have to do that? I'll trust a server as much as I trust
the PGP key of the person who signed it. That's the same as trusting
an httpd download because it's signed by someone whose key I trust.
The
Personally, I feel this role belongs in the government.
Whose government? I don't even trust my own government, so why should I trust
a foreign government?
Joost
It is a little unclear to me about the combination of security and efficiency that we can achieve by using PGP keys and the web-of-trust on the web. Imagine connecting to you bank or online stock broker. If they would certify themselves using PGP certificates, they will need to have a large number
Nick Kew wrote:
Huh? The same person who installs the cert now. It's just a different
signature. And for those who want a certificate authority, have such
authorities (the more the better) sign *their* PGP keys.
>From whomsoever is responsible for it. Maybe even more than one
On Nov 4, 2005, at 10:56 AM, William A. Rowe, Jr. wrote:
It leaves us wondering; how can allow from/deny from n.n.n.n be mapped
to
RFC 2616 semantics, or at least, without running the many server hooks
on
later requests? The only way I can see, is that we should have any
more
explicit allow
Roy T.Fielding wrote:
On Nov 4, 2005, at 10:56 AM, William A. Rowe, Jr. wrote:
It leaves us wondering; how can allow from/deny from n.n.n.n be mapped to
RFC 2616 semantics, or at least, without running the many server hooks on
later requests? The only way I can see, is that we should have
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