Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

2007-03-01 Thread Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)
Ben Bucksch wrote: (You *may* be thinking of DV (Domain Validation) and Class 1 SSL certs. These are indeed insecure and make SSL a joke. They were a really bad idea and that is one of the reasons behind EV.) Ben, the reason behind EV (or any higher verification in that respect) is about the

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

2007-03-01 Thread Alaric Dailey
Heikki Toivonen wrote: Alaric Dailey wrote: than doing things right. For example SSL for identification is worthless without DNS being secured, and no-one on any list wants to talk about that. Unfortunately, the number people who actually I don't understand how you can claim this.

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

2007-03-01 Thread Boris Zbarsky
Ben Bucksch wrote: I would much rather have more information about the existing certs ... At very least this gives ME the chance to decide rather than giving me a false sense of security. You already have that info with Tools | Page Info (in Firefox; Seamonkey in View menu IIRC), Security tab.

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

2007-03-01 Thread Gervase Markham
Ben Bucksch wrote: (You *may* be thinking of DV (Domain Validation) and Class 1 SSL certs. These are indeed insecure and make SSL a joke. They were a really bad idea and that is one of the reasons behind EV.) Well, even DV certs are supposed to be only issued to the person in control of the

Re: Mozilla Products Included Certificates

2007-03-01 Thread Gervase Markham
Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: Well, what I don't understand really, why you list the various bugs multiple times? Because it means that each line gives, unambiguously, the certs for that version of the product. You don't need to add up all the lines before it. Additionally 338552 was

Re: Practical steps question for multi-level proposal

2007-03-01 Thread Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)
Gervase Markham wrote: Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: This is why I asked how to continue from here. But there is a general proposal on the table, which can be taken as the basis to form a new policy etc. So which steps would you propose? Shaping and refining the proposal could be one of

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

2007-03-01 Thread Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)
Gervase Markham wrote: Oh, and I'm sure we're taking patches for DNSSec support in Firefox. Aren't we? This however would be a very good idea! -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

2007-03-01 Thread Alaric Dailey
Oh, and I'm sure we're taking patches for DNSSec support in Firefox. Aren't we? No, but its a good idea. Yes, and actually, SSL goes much further than DNSsec. The latter is good to prevent DNS spoofs and is much-needed, but it does nothing to protect the content. Actually, you could

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

2007-03-01 Thread Boris Zbarsky
This is probably my last response in this thread, since I'm about to stop reading it altogether (as so many others already have, I should note), but I do have to respond to this, because there's hope that a reasoned response would have effect, unlike in some of the other subthreads. Alaric

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

2007-03-01 Thread L. David Baron
Boris Zbarsky wrote: Alaric Dailey wrote: If DNS were secure, then attempts to use a stolen cert would be thwarted. Not particularly. As someone pointed out, anyone who steals a cert and can affect the routing of your packets can screw you. Not if we were to strengthen the rules by saying

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

2007-03-01 Thread L. David Baron
Alaric Dailey wrote: As far as a fix for DNS, everyone hates hearing it, but the fix is already out there no one wants to use it though http://www.dnssec.com I wouldn't say nobody wants to use it. I'd love to use it. See, e.g., https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=342242 . I think

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

2007-03-01 Thread Boris Zbarsky
Alaric Dailey wrote: Sure even if we don't steal the cert, most users don't read error boxes so you could redirect them and use a fake cert. This is again an orthogonal problem. Browser handling of things like hostname/cert mismatches is abysmal. If they don't match, we should not show