(allo lucas, i linked this discussion here via googlegroups:
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Apps/Security#Concepts_to_be_given_Official_Definitions)
On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 4:27 AM, Lucas Adamski wrote:
> Discussion so far has illustrated the fact that we need to define what a "B2G
> app" actually mea
On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 10:45 PM, Ben Francis wrote:
> I've had a read over the wiki page and there's certainly a lot of
> information to take in and I think there's lots still to discuss.
he he - yeah it's a monster area this.
> Here are some of my (slightly naive) questions and opinions on wh
On Mar 15, 2012, at 3:45 PM, Ben Francis wrote:
> I've had a read over the wiki page and there's certainly a lot of
> information to take in and I think there's lots still to discuss.
>
> Here are some of my (slightly naive) questions and opinions on what's been
> written so far...
>
> == Distri
Discussion so far has illustrated the fact that we need to define what a "B2G
app" actually means at a foundational level. That means defining what an app
can consist of, the origin of those assets, and how they are delivered, updated
and stored on the device. I'd like to fork this into its ow
Pretty crazy. :) I believe most webAPIs that I've seen discussed have limited
API access requests to the top level content only, which I think is a good
compromise. I'm sure someone will school me on any exceptions though.
Lucas.
--
A fanatic is one who can't change his mind and won't chang
I was trying to transcribe an earlier post by Jim in which he mentioned
some permissions manager work he is working.
Replies inline.
- Original Message -
> From: "lkcl luke"
> To: "David Chan"
> Cc: "Jim Straus" , dev-weba...@lists.mozilla.org,
> phillip...@gmail.com, "Mozilla B2G mail
On Thu, 15 Mar 2012 22:45:56 +
Ben Francis wrote:
> Web apps should be hosted, not packaged. How do you sign code that's
> constantly changing? Sometimes when web apps are updated there are
> different versions of resources on different nodes of a cluster behind a
> load balancer, or different
Yea, I was thinking more of the bullying case which is something I don't
think that Android and iOS apps have to deal with much currently. The
option to remember allow/deny addresses the issue I believe.
Extremely hypothetical case. What if an app wants a permission but you
only want to allow it
I'm not sure phishing works in a phone. There is no password. Yes, an app
could put up a display that looks like the Permissions Manager app. Yes, the
user could touch whatever controls would grant permissions. No, the
permissions would not change. No an app can't modify the display of the
I've had a read over the wiki page and there's certainly a lot of
information to take in and I think there's lots still to discuss.
Here are some of my (slightly naive) questions and opinions on what's been
written so far...
== Distribution/management of WebApps ==
"A telco can decide which stor
2012/3/15 lkcl luke :
> anyway, the point is that there are separate security requirements for:
>
> * the root frame (top-level one into which the top gaia HTML is loaded)
> * individual gaia apps (sub-iframes, one per app)
> * any gaia app that opens up a public-facing (URL-based) iframe - th
On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 10:00 PM, Jim Straus wrote:
> I'm not sure an app can effectively bully the user.
[]
> An app COULD complain to the user if they are denied access and try to get
> them to go to the Permissions Manager app, but I suspect any app that was so
> abusive would be dele
>
> scenario:
>
> * application requests access to geolocation
> * user says "no".
> * application responds by creating a timer that goes off every 30 seconds
> * on each timer ping, application puts up a popup "you didn't give me
> access to geolocation. GIVE ME ACCESS TO GEOLOCATION".
>
> t
On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 9:50 PM, Justin Lebar wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 5:44 PM, David Chan wrote:
>> Sorry I should have used the same nomenclature that was used earlier.
>>
>> Polling as in the app repeated asks for geolocation because it "failed".
>> Having different failures for denie
On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 9:14 PM, David Chan wrote:
> I broke this out into its own heading
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/Apps/Security#Centralized_permissions_manager
i'm reading this section... it's very hard to understand the concept
being proposed. even the purpose of the proposed "Centralised
I'm not sure an app can effectively bully the user. If the user selects
"permanently deny", the dialog won't ever come up again (obviously, the user
can change their mind by going to the Permissions Manager App). So, a chess
program that wants to use geolocation would try to use the API. The
On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 9:31 PM, Justin Lebar wrote:
>> There is still an open question on how a permissions manager should
>> respond in the event of a DENIED permission. One suggestion is to not
>> error out but return some default/safe value e.g. no contacts if an
>> app is not granted Contacts
On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 5:44 PM, David Chan wrote:
> Sorry I should have used the same nomenclature that was used earlier.
>
> Polling as in the app repeated asks for geolocation because it "failed".
> Having different failures for denied vs can't lock onto GPS would solve
> this, but I don't kno
Sorry I should have used the same nomenclature that was used earlier.
Polling as in the app repeated asks for geolocation because it "failed".
Having different failures for denied vs can't lock onto GPS would solve
this, but I don't know how much it matters for an app.
David
- Original Mes
> There is still an open question on how a permissions manager should
> respond in the event of a DENIED permission. One suggestion is to not
> error out but return some default/safe value e.g. no contacts if an
> app is not granted Contacts information. A concern of this proposal
> is that an app
On 03/15/2012 10:52 AM, Adrienne Porter Felt wrote:
I'd also like to raise the issue of what happens to permissions when
principals interact. Do webapps have iframes like websites? Can they
embed advertisements? Do the advertisers then get all of the permissions?
How crazy would "no iframes
I broke this out into its own heading
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Apps/Security#Centralized_permissions_manager
Similar ideas were discussed later in the thread. I don't believe
I've seen any objections to having permissions being centralized for
control / auditing purposes.
There is still an open
Lets just say that's close enough for purposes of this discussion. :) The open
web technologies part is the key. The idea is that if we provide consistent
APIs across many platforms and containers (you can use the same app in a
browser or installed on a phone) then that investment allows a lar
On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 6:59 PM, SUN Haitao wrote:
> A security model only considering packages seems not enough:
>
> As far as I can tell, there are 4 (or more) types of possible runnables on
> B2G:
> 0) Kernel, drivers (including virtual device drivers), CLI tools
> (including services), browse
A security model only considering packages seems not enough:
As far as I can tell, there are 4 (or more) types of possible runnables on B2G:
0) Kernel, drivers (including virtual device drivers), CLI tools
(including services), browser engine and (maybe) plug-ins.
1) Packed programs written in HTM
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Apps/Security#Open_questions
point 3 - eval. which someone raised eariler.
ok, i'm dealing with a situation in pyjamas-desktop where it can't
actually execute javascript. so what has to be done is: you inject a
script node into the body of the HTML using python DOM bind
On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 5:52 PM, Adrienne Porter Felt wrote:
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/Apps/Security#Management_.2F_granting_of_API_permissions_to_WebApps
>
> Under "Management / granting of API permissions to WebApps", I think two
> important points are missing:
>
> 4. User should be able to aud
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Apps/Security#Management_.2F_granting_of_API_permissions_to_WebApps
Under "Management / granting of API permissions to WebApps", I think two
important points are missing:
4. User should be able to audit usage of permissions (this is different
from viewing what permissions
On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 1:30 PM, Justin Lebar wrote:
> To boil this proposal down into its key points:
>
> 1) App lists desired permissions in its manifest.
> 2) App store approves permissions on app's submission.
> 3) User approves permissions at install time.
> 4) Some permissions need to be gra
Hello everyone,
I couldn't find a specific mailing list for GSoC related discussion so
thought I'd email the security developers list and ask about this.
I came across former ideas of Mozilla in security and found
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Community:SummerOfCode10#NSS_.28Network_Security_Services.2
On 15/03/12 12:54 PM, Lucas Adamski wrote:
https://developer.mozilla.org/en/OpenWebApps has some good info.
But in terms of business objectives, I'll do a terrible job of paraphrasing the
mission: maximize participation in the
open web. This means breaking up the app silos by maximizing the n
On Wed, 14 Mar 2012 17:09:00 -0700 (PDT)
David Chan wrote:
> The analogous idea in the B2G world would be that Mozilla,
> telcos, company foo could all run their own stores. If a user doesn't like
> the policies of the existing stores, they can start their own. However,
> there wouldn't be a wa
On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 3:26 AM, Chris Jones wrote:
> That's right: the ideal model is one process per "app" and one process per
> (arbitrary web content).
processes (fork) are not secure, and are not securable. privilege
escalation is still possible. for maximum security (even when not
usin
On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 1:54 AM, Lucas Adamski wrote:
> https://developer.mozilla.org/en/OpenWebApps has some good info.
>
> But in terms of business objectives, I'll do a terrible job of paraphrasing
> the mission: maximize participation in the
> open web.
maximise participation for whom?
..
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