Re: Extract of CA certificates

2008-02-11 Thread Frank Hecker
f you're interested in pursuing this further, I'd be glad to correspond with you via email to give you and your lawyer my personal opinions on the situation. Frank -- Frank Hecker [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ dev-security mailing list dev-

Re: Extract of CA certificates

2008-02-10 Thread Frank Hecker
t remember at the moment exactly what they apparently were trying to accomplish by doing this.) Frank -- Frank Hecker [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Updating Mozilla CA certificate policy to address EV certificates

2007-10-09 Thread Frank Hecker
quot; to the policy itself. My primary goal is to address the EV-related policy changes, and to do so as expeditiously as possible. Anyway, if you have comments on this general topic please feel free to post them here. In the meantime I'll work to come up with an initial draft of proposed

Re: "http://www33.not-found-entry.org/search?qo=..." is default "server not found" page

2007-09-27 Thread Frank Hecker
ou connect to the net using DHCP (which is almost always the case for consumer Macs) then the network operator can supply their own DNS server information, and pull tricks like the one you encountered. Do you see this on your home network, or when you're on a "foreign" network, e.g

Re: certificate challenged, for what?

2007-03-29 Thread Frank Hecker
r content being inserted into the page by means of https URLs. How to handle this in an understandable manner is not IMO a trivial problem. Frank -- Frank Hecker [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Removing support for --disable-crypto

2007-02-12 Thread Frank Hecker
RNG, hash functions, etc.), and include the non-encryption parts by default, leaving -disable-crypto to govern only the encryption functionality. However I don't know whether this would be practical or useful. Frank -- Frank Hecker [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___

Re: Possible security models

2006-09-13 Thread Frank Hecker
Boris Zbarsky wrote: Frank Hecker wrote: Maybe it's just my ignorance, but I'm confused: Did you actually mean to write that Python and other languages are equivalent to JavaScript, e.g., for the "checks in glue" model checks would be done at entry from Python into C++, j

Re: Possible security models

2006-09-13 Thread Frank Hecker
ecks would be done at entry from Python into C++, just as would be done for JavaScript? Frank -- Frank Hecker [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Is NSSCKBI.DLL safe?

2006-07-26 Thread Frank Hecker
ords. For "legacy" CA certs (i.e., inherited from the AOL/Netscape regime) we haven't yet gone through and subjected them to the same process. Instead we're adopting a "management by exception" policy where we'll look at a particular CA if someone reports a potent

Re: Is NSSCKBI.DLL safe?

2006-07-26 Thread Frank Hecker
sue, and I don't have time to try to summarize all the differing positions and their pros and cons.) There are not as many Microsoft secure sites with this problem as there were even six months ago. That's because over time Microsoft has reconfigured its servers t

Re: Is NSSCKBI.DLL safe?

2006-07-25 Thread Frank Hecker
oops199 wrote: Well now based on what Frank Hecker has posted, this is really getting interesting. First he stalwardly defends FF. Then he acknowledges that much of what was reported and commented on is in fact not wrong. And now he begs off as not being an expert. I'm sorry, I

Re: Is NSSCKBI.DLL safe?

2006-07-25 Thread Frank Hecker
Frank Hecker wrote: 2. I then used the "Delete" button to attempt to delete the root CA certificate that was pre-loaded . The operation attempted to succeed and the root CA cert disappeared from the displayed list. Sorry, I meant to write "The operation appeared to suc

Re: Is NSSCKBI.DLL safe?

2006-07-25 Thread Frank Hecker
by the user. This is a relatively uncommon thing, which may be why we don't split intermediate CAs out as a separate list in the Firefox UI. However I'm not really the expert on this particular aspect of Firefox, so I'll defer to others more knowledgeable than I. Frank -- Fran

Re: Is NSSCKBI.DLL safe?

2006-07-25 Thread Frank Hecker
you or anyone else thinks there are security problems with a particular CA, please file a bug in Bugzilla or send a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED], along with *specific* evidence of the problem and the resulting threat to users. Please also include any evidence related to what the CA has or hasn&

Re: Is NSSCKBI.DLL safe?

2006-07-25 Thread Frank Hecker
e list. Note that there is substantial (though not 100%) overlap between the various lists; for example, the Thawte, USERtrust, and Quo Vadis CAs mentioned in the PSC newsletter are in both the Mozilla list and the Windows list. I hope this answers the questions raised by the PSC newsletter. I

Re: "Why Phishing Works" paper

2006-03-31 Thread Frank Hecker
West are well-known banks in California, Capital One is a major Visa card issuer that (I think) does a fair amount of advertising to students, and Tele-BEARS is the Berkeley class enrollment system. Frank -- Frank Hecker [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ dev

"Why Phishing Works" paper

2006-03-30 Thread Frank Hecker
This really should be required reading for anyone interested in anti-phishing defenses, the SSL UI, and related topics: http://www.deas.harvard.edu/~rachna/papers/why_phishing_works.pdf Frank -- Frank Hecker [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ dev-security