Re: Name-constraining government CAs, or not

2015-05-19 Thread Ryan Sleevi
On Mon, May 18, 2015 10:39 pm, Eric Mill wrote: You said: I disagree that we, the browsers and standards bodies of the Internet have very different leverage [over governments than corporations]. My description above wasn't to lay out the ills of the world, but to describe why the kind of

Re: Name-constraining government CAs, or not

2015-05-19 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On 2015-05-19 12:04, Gervase Markham wrote: On 18/05/15 17:39, Kurt Roeckx wrote: On the other hand, if it covers the whole country, they can abuse it for domains in that country, but not for other domains. I'm not sure why you would find it acceptable that they can abuse it in their own

Re: Name-constraining government CAs, or not

2015-05-19 Thread Gervase Markham
On 19/05/15 02:15, Matt Palmer wrote: I disagree that we, the browsers and standards bodies of the Internet have very different leverage. In either case, if a CA misbehaves, their root certs can be pulled from the trust store (or otherwise neutered). That doesn't change because the CA is run

Re: Name-constraining government CAs, or not

2015-05-19 Thread Gervase Markham
On 18/05/15 17:39, Kurt Roeckx wrote: On the other hand, if it covers the whole country, they can abuse it for domains in that country, but not for other domains. I'm not sure why you would find it acceptable that they can abuse it in their own country. Some countries, AIUI, do not have an

Re: Name-constraining government CAs, or not

2015-05-19 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On 2015-05-14 17:25, Gervase Markham wrote: CAs currently in Mozilla's program which may fit one or more definitions of government CA are: It might be a little out of scope of your question, but maybe we should agree on what we think the (government) CAs should be able to do and what not.