RE: Suspicious test.com Cert Issued By GlobalSign

2017-03-16 Thread Nio via dev-security-policy
>Back in 2015, there were some GlobalSign testing in which users thought it was >acceptable to use domains like test.com and example.com for testing purposes. >Since this time, GlobalSign has implemented procedures to avoid any similar >situations in the future. Does it mean that

RE: Suspicious test.com Cert Issued By GlobalSign

2017-03-16 Thread Nio via dev-security-policy
>Back in 2015, there were some GlobalSign testing in which users thought it was >acceptable to use domains like test.com and example.com for testing purposes. >Since this time, GlobalSign has implemented procedures to avoid any similar >situations in the future. Does it mean that

Re: Include Renewed Kamu SM root certificate

2017-03-16 Thread Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
On Wednesday, March 15, 2017 at 9:56:25 AM UTC-7, Kathleen Wilson wrote: > Thanks to those of you who have reviewed and commented on this request from > the Government of Turkey, Kamu Sertifikasyon Merkezi (Kamu SM), to include > the "TUBITAK Kamu SM SSL Kok Sertifikasi - Surum 1" root

Re: Suspicious test.com Cert Issued By GlobalSign

2017-03-16 Thread Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
On 16/03/17 11:25, douglas.beat...@gmail.com wrote: > For the record, we don't think it's necessary (or permissible) to > give employees (RAs) the power to add arbitrary domains to accounts > without proper vetting. I guess I'm still not being clear - sorry :-( Let me try one more time: Why does

RE: Symantec: Next Steps

2017-03-16 Thread Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
We have DTP and RA roles slated as part of the validation WG discussion, but only as they relate to validation. -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.mozilla .org] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy

Re: Symantec: Next Steps

2017-03-16 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 6:01 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On 09/03/17 13:32, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > (Wearing Google hat only for this statement) > > Have you considered having this discussion in the CA/Browser Forum? > Google > >

Re: Suspicious test.com Cert Issued By GlobalSign

2017-03-16 Thread douglas.beattie--- via dev-security-policy
On Thursday, March 16, 2017 at 6:59:41 AM UTC-4, Gervase Markham wrote: > Hi Doug, > > On 03/03/17 11:17, Gervase Markham wrote: > > That's lovely, but it doesn't answer my question. Let me restate it: why > > does GlobalSign believe it is necessary to give employees the power to > > add

Re: SHA-1 serverAuth cert issued by Trustis in November 2016

2017-03-16 Thread Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
Hi Blake, On 02/03/17 16:26, blake.mor...@trustis.com wrote: > We have engaged with our external auditors in relation to this and the > previous certificate that was reported. Once that activity has concluded we > will be providing further information. Do you have an ETA for this incident

Re: Suspicious test.com Cert Issued By GlobalSign

2017-03-16 Thread Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
Hi Doug, On 03/03/17 11:17, Gervase Markham wrote: > That's lovely, but it doesn't answer my question. Let me restate it: why > does GlobalSign believe it is necessary to give employees the power to > add arbitrary domains to accounts without going through ownership > validation? You are getting

Re: GlobalSign BR violation

2017-03-16 Thread Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
On 28/02/17 20:02, douglas.beat...@gmail.com wrote: > And lastly this ticket. The Domain name was validated in accordance > with the BRs, but there was a bug that allowed a user entered space > to be included in some of the SAN values. While the value is not > compliant with RFC 5280 or the BRs,

Re: Incapsula via GlobalSign issued[ing] a certificate for non-existing domain (testslsslfeb20.me)

2017-03-16 Thread Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
On 03/03/17 20:59, douglas.beat...@gmail.com wrote: > In general, when we receive new orders and issue certificates, the > vetting is done just prior to issuance time which permits the > certificate to be replaced up until expiration. We're looking into > cases where new "orders" may have used

Re: Google Trust Services roots

2017-03-16 Thread Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
On 16/03/17 10:50, Gervase Markham wrote: > https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:RootTransferPolicy#Change_in_Legal_Ownership With these changes and the filing of https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1347882 , I consider this particular discussion RESOLVED. This means Mozilla plans to take no

Re: Google Trust Services roots

2017-03-16 Thread Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
On 08/03/17 16:20, Gervase Markham wrote: > On 09/02/17 22:55, Peter Bowen wrote: >> Policy Suggestion A) When transferring a root that is EV enabled, it >> should be clearly stated whether the recipient of the root is also >> receiving the EV policy OID(s). > > I agree with this suggestion; we

Re: Google Trust Services roots

2017-03-16 Thread Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
On 07/03/17 10:18, Gervase Markham wrote: > OK. Question for group: would it make sense to add the intermediate(s) > that GlobalSign is using for this purpose directly to the Mozilla trust > store, with the EV bit enabled, and then remove the EV bit from the > roots now owned by Google Trust

Re: DigiCert BR violation

2017-03-16 Thread Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
On 13/03/17 21:31, Jeremy Rowley wrote: > [JR] If you recall, I did try to change the policy. I was told to > change the RFC if I didn’t like the requirement. I find trying to > change the RFC nearly impossible as PKIX is dead and there are too > many other issues people would also like to

Re: Symantec: Next Steps

2017-03-16 Thread Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
On 08/03/17 15:06, Peter Bowen wrote: > By eliminating the DTP option, you will massively raise costs for CAs > that rely upon local translators and information gatherers. I think a > much better proposal would be to require the CA perform the RA > activity contemplated by BR 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5

Re: Symantec: Next Steps

2017-03-16 Thread Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
On 09/03/17 13:32, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > (Wearing Google hat only for this statement) > Have you considered having this discussion in the CA/Browser Forum? Google > had planned to discuss this very topic at our upcoming F2F about how to > address this, and would be very interested in collaborating