SwissSign: Misissuance of Intermediate Certificates because of incorrect organizationIdentifier

2018-11-12 Thread Mike via dev-security-policy
This post links to https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1506607 Issue description: Misissuing of Intermediate Certificates because of incorrect organizationIdentifier For the intermediate CA listed below the organizationIdentifier= NTRL-FL-0002.523.017-8 is wrong. The correct value is

Re: Questions regarding the qualifications and competency of TUVIT

2018-11-12 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
Jakob, Please see https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/Q9whve-HJfM/lpwKQXOfAgAJ , which was already provided previously. It includes details regarding T-Systems areas of non-compliance that were 1) Demonstrably not identified by the auditor 2) Covered by existing audit

Re: CA Communication: Underscores in dNSNames

2018-11-12 Thread Man Ho via dev-security-policy
When the ballot said "... would result in a valid domain label", does it mean that "... would result in a valid domain name of the applicant, that has passed the same level of domain authorization (DV, OV, EV) check? Secondly, is it necessary for CAs to state their practice of handling

Re: Questions regarding the qualifications and competency of TUVIT

2018-11-12 Thread Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
Ryan, Could you please provide, in a single message, a list of all the supposedly multiple failures by TUVIT, clearly marking each if it is: Subject O: [Other] A failure outside the specific subjects below. Subject D: [Discussion] A failure by TUVIT to satisfactorily answer your questions

CA Communication: Underscores in dNSNames

2018-11-12 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
As you may be aware, the CA/Browser Forum recently passed ballot SC12 [1] creating a sunset period for TLS certificates containing an underscore ("_") character in the SAN. This practice was widespread until a year ago when it was pointed out that underscore characters are not permitted in dNSName

Re: Questions regarding the qualifications and competency of TUVIT

2018-11-12 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
Nick, I find your continued suggestions to be actively harmful - to the discussion, for sure, but also to the reputation of ETSI. You've attempted to frame this, again, as an either/or approach - that is, that we can only have one of these discussions. You've attempted to "thread-jack" the

Re: Questions regarding the qualifications and competency of TUVIT

2018-11-12 Thread Nick Pope via dev-security-policy
Ryan, I see the main question is what is the most productive way ahead. We can continue discussing a specific concern in the context of just 1 of the European auditor, or work in the EU on a considered approach to all the concerns which can be applied to all European based audits. The first

Re: Questions regarding the qualifications and competency of TUVIT

2018-11-12 Thread Nick Pope via dev-security-policy
Ryan, The difference in opinion seems to be which approach is most productive. Targeting particular concerns at an individual auditor or clearly stating all your concerns on European based audits for PTC so that we can come back come back with a common decision how, through ETSI standards and