Re: Disclosure and CP/CPS for Cross-Signed Roots

2019-07-24 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
Thank you Rob! These are excellent additions to this report. I'd like to ask all the CA representatives on this list to take a look at the updated report (https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures) and correct any issues with your company's disclosures as soon as possible. Regarding Peter's earlier

Re: Nation State MITM CA's ?

2019-07-24 Thread Matthew Hardeman via dev-security-policy
This is not at all a safe assumption. If they care to know and have active MITM infrastructure in place, the last time I looked at the issue, identifying which browser was in use (and generally speaking which operating system or set of operating systems) was fairly trivial by fingerprinting the

Re: Nation State MITM CA's ?

2019-07-24 Thread jfb1776--- via dev-security-policy
The government sending out SMSes to tell users to install the certificate don't (until the certificate is installed) know what browser the user is using. So, in addition to blacklisting the certificate, have it pop up a big, horrible message "Your government wants to use this to spy on you. It

Re: Disclosure and CP/CPS for Cross-Signed Roots

2019-07-24 Thread Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy
[Wearing Sectigo hat] Andrew, thanks for filing [1]. Sectigo will provide a full response on that bug, but I'll just note here that we have updated the CCADB records for the cross-certificates such that the Audit and CP/CPS details are now consistent with the Web.com roots. As it happens, I

Re: DarkMatter CAs in Google Chrome and Android

2019-07-24 Thread Scott Rea via dev-security-policy
G’day Devon et al, Can you please detail the reason behind Google withdrawing trust for the UAE NPKI intermediates? Can you also please provide the timeline for the in-band delivery of the restriction by Google? As you can imagine this will have catastrophic impact for existing customers and