ing and CRL data was correct during the
same period.
No additional improvements are outstanding at this time.
--
Andy Warner
Google Trust Services
smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
___
dev-security-policy mailing list
year
misses the much shorter timeline that needs to be honored for CAA.
--
Andy Warner
Google Trust Services
On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 3:57 PM Kurt Roeckx wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 02:53:26PM -0700, Andy Warner via
> dev-security-policy wrote:
> >
> > 1. The new text added t
the severity of the issue.
--
Andy Warner
Google Trust Services
On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 9:21:26 AM UTC-7, Dimitris Zacharopoulos wrote:
> On 2019-09-23 5:00 μ.μ., Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote:
> > No. That’s the more dangerous approach which I’ve tried repeatedly to
>
alance convergence versus a rush to decisions that may
adversely affect the ecosystem or be a challenge to live with for years.
--
Andy Warner
Google Trust Services
On Friday, September 20, 2019 at 1:20:02 PM UTC-7, Curt Spann wrote:
> This is a great discussion and I want to thank everyone fo
oogle Trust Services considers this matter fully addressed. We will of course
continue our ongoing internal review program, but no other work or information
is outstanding at this point.
--
Andy Warner
Google Trust Services
On Friday, August 30, 2019 at 2:39:51 PM UTC-4, Andy Warner wrote:
> Th
This is an initial report and we expect to provide some additional details and
the completion timeline after a bit more verification and full deployment of
in-flight mitigations. We are posting the most complete information we have
currently to comply with Mozilla reporting timelines and will fo
evolving the code to the point it became more complicated than
it needed to be.
On Thu, Aug 23, 2018 at 9:40 AM Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Aug 23, 2018 at 8:50 AM, Andy Warner via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>>
>> * NOTE:
tools to further ensure that we have strong knowledge of the
pedigree of all code and how it was built and deployed.
On Thu, Aug 23, 2018 at 10:55 AM Nick Lamb wrote:
> On Thu, 23 Aug 2018 05:50:05 -0700 (PDT)
> Andy Warner via dev-security-policy
> wrote:
>
> > May 21st 20
usion rules and have more flexible tests. I want to discuss this with
the engineer who implemented the changes to ensure they agree with how I
would summarize the changes. Update to follow.
On Thu, Aug 23, 2018 at 8:57 AM Alex Gaynor wrote:
> Hi Andy,
>
> Just so I follow, this is some
Please note, Google wrote this report for internal use immediately after the
issue. We intended to post it to m.d.s.p at that time, but securing internal
approvals took a while and the posting ended-up on the back burner for a bit.
It was a minor issue, but we want the community to be aware of i
Google Trust Services published updated CP & CPS versions earlier today
covering CAA checking. I'd suggest checking all CAs again tomorrow. Given the
range of timezones CA operational staffs operate across, some may not have had
a chance to publish their updates yet.
In terms of the 'rush' I su
manager of StartCom Europe that Eddy announced this in
CABF mail list.
Regards,
Andy
On 2016/9/3 16:17, Percy wrote:
I did an analysis of the new StartCom website and determined that it was designed and
implemented solely in China.
http://www.percya.com/2016/09/startcom-operated-solely-in
It might for you but maybe something between you're system and hers is
different so it works for you but not for her
as my sig line says iam a computer tech i build sell service and consult.
sometimes you can have to 2 identical systems side by side and one will work
fine and the other has proble
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