log signing key compromise
On Sunday, May 3, 2020 at 7:35:44 PM UTC-4, Alex Cohn wrote:
> Thank you for the clarification. This would appear to introduce a new
> requirement for clients verifying SCTs from CT2: a get-proof-by-hash
> call to the log server (or a mirror) is now require
not
react to the media publication when it first came out. That is a question we
are digging into.
From: Ian Carroll
Sent: Sunday, May 3, 2020 5:55 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley
Cc: Mozilla
Subject: Re: CT2 log signing key compromise
Hi Jeremy,
Can you clarify why you believe the signing key cannot
Hi Jeremy,
Can you clarify why you believe the signing key cannot be easily used? Is
there a cryptographic limitation in what was disclosed?
Also, do you have plans for a more formal post-mortem? Since vulnerability
management is usually an organization-wide process, it would be useful to
doesn’t
exist. However, there is still the multiple log requirement.
From: Alex Cohn
Sent: Sunday, May 3, 2020 5:35 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley
Cc: Mozilla
Subject: Re: CT2 log signing key compromise
Thank you for the clarification. This would appear to introduce a new
requirement for clients
signing key compromise
They would already appear in a previous tree where the head was signed by us.
From: Alex Cohn
Sent: Sunday, May 3, 2020 5:22 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley
Cc: Mozilla
Subject: Re: CT2 log signing key compromise
The timestamp on a SCT is fully controlled by the signer, so why
PM
> *To:* Jeremy Rowley
> *Cc:* Mozilla
> *Subject:* Re: CT2 log signing key compromise
>
>
>
> The timestamp on a SCT is fully controlled by the signer, so why should
> SCTs bearing a timestamp before May 2 still be considered trusted?
>
>
>
> Alex
>
>
They would already appear in a previous tree where the head was signed by us.
From: Alex Cohn
Sent: Sunday, May 3, 2020 5:22 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley
Cc: Mozilla
Subject: Re: CT2 log signing key compromise
The timestamp on a SCT is fully controlled by the signer, so why should SCTs
bearing
The timestamp on a SCT is fully controlled by the signer, so why should
SCTs bearing a timestamp before May 2 still be considered trusted?
Alex
On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 6:19 PM Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> Hey all,
>
> The key used to
Hey all,
The key used to sign SCTs for the CT2 log was compromised yesterday at 7pm
through the Salt root bug. The remaining logs remain uncompromised and run on
separate infrastructure. We discovered the compromise today and are working to
turn that log into read only mode so that no new
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