Re: Do We Now Require Separate Cross-certificates for SSL and S/MIME?

2018-08-15 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
The updated 2.6.1 version of the Mozilla Root Store policy resulting from this discussion is now published: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/ - Wayne On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 3:28 PM Wayne Thayer wrote: > Having received no comments on this prop

Re: Do We Now Require Separate Cross-certificates for SSL and S/MIME?

2018-08-06 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
Having received no comments on this proposal, I plan to go ahead and publish version 2.6.1 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy with the third paragraph of section 5.3 clarified as follows: Intermediate certificates created after January 1, 2019, with the exception of cross-certificates that share a p

Re: Do We Now Require Separate Cross-certificates for SSL and S/MIME?

2018-07-18 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
Kathleen pointed out that one of the purposes of this section is to require disclosure of cross-certificates, and my first attempted fix seems to violate that purpose. Here is my second attempt to clarify the language in section 5.3: https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/commit/43bdf5d6e97cdda0d8b1

Re: Do We Now Require Separate Cross-certificates for SSL and S/MIME?

2018-07-17 Thread Bruce via dev-security-policy
On Monday, July 16, 2018 at 7:25:09 PM UTC-4, Wayne Thayer wrote: > On Fri, Jul 13, 2018 at 3:50 PM Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > > Yeah, I agree I don’t think it was intended. But now that I am aware of > > the issue, I think the cros

Re: Do We Now Require Separate Cross-certificates for SSL and S/MIME?

2018-07-16 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
f > Bruce via > > dev-security-policy > > Sent: Friday, July 13, 2018 10:17 AM > > To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org > > Subject: Re: Do We Now Require Separate Cross-certificates for SSL and > > S/MIME? > > > > Agreed that old cross-certifi

RE: Do We Now Require Separate Cross-certificates for SSL and S/MIME?

2018-07-13 Thread Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy
ozilla.org] On Behalf Of Bruce via > dev-security-policy > Sent: Friday, July 13, 2018 10:17 AM > To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org > Subject: Re: Do We Now Require Separate Cross-certificates for SSL and > S/MIME? > > Agreed that old cross-certificates will no

Re: Do We Now Require Separate Cross-certificates for SSL and S/MIME?

2018-07-13 Thread Bruce via dev-security-policy
-- > > From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy- > > bounces+tim.hollebeek=digicert@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Bruce via > > dev-security-policy > > Sent: Thursday, July 12, 2018 10:28 AM > > To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org > > S

RE: Do We Now Require Separate Cross-certificates for SSL and S/MIME?

2018-07-13 Thread Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy
s+tim.hollebeek=digicert@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Bruce via > dev-security-policy > Sent: Thursday, July 12, 2018 10:28 AM > To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org > Subject: Re: Do We Now Require Separate Cross-certificates for SSL and > S/MIME? > > Note the BRs defin

Re: Do We Now Require Separate Cross-certificates for SSL and S/MIME?

2018-07-12 Thread Bruce via dev-security-policy
Note the BRs define Cross Certificate as "a certificate that is used to establish a trust relationship between two Root CAs." I think the intent was to technically restrict subordinate CAs or rather CAs which are online and issue end entity certificates. My assumption is that we want to 1) not

Do We Now Require Separate Cross-certificates for SSL and S/MIME?

2018-07-10 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
During a 2.6 policy discussion [1], we agreed to add the following language to section 5.3 "Intermediate Certificates": > Intermediate certificates created after January 1, 2019: > > > * MUST contain an EKU extension; and, > * MUST NOT include the anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId; and, > * MUST NO