Re: How harsh (in general) should Mozilla be towards CAs?

2018-11-09 Thread Eric Mill via dev-security-policy
On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 8:51 PM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Over the years, there has been some variation among participants in how > harshly individual mistakes by CAs should be judged, ranging from "just > file a satisfactory incident repor

Re: How harsh (in general) should Mozilla be towards CAs?

2018-11-09 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
I'm not convinced there is an answer here. It seems that most would agree with the premise that we should consider the circumstances and context for an issue and make a balanced assessment. That leaves the matter of what this means in practice up for debate. Often, it appears to be a debate between

Re: How harsh (in general) should Mozilla be towards CAs?

2018-11-09 Thread Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
On 09/11/2018 15:52, Hanno Böck wrote: On Fri, 9 Nov 2018 14:56:41 +0100 Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy wrote: However there are also some very harsh punishments handed out, such as distrusting some CAs (most notably happened to Symantec and WoSign, but others are also teetering), and dist

RE: How harsh (in general) should Mozilla be towards CAs?

2018-11-09 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
Jakob Bohm wrote "Each of these arguments for maximum punishment and/or maximum inconvenience for innocent bystanders is backed by a formal/legal interpretation of existing rules as making this the only possible outcome." I'd agree - heavy-handed, strict enforcement of some rules unnecessarily p

Re: How harsh (in general) should Mozilla be towards CAs?

2018-11-09 Thread Hanno Böck via dev-security-policy
On Fri, 9 Nov 2018 14:56:41 +0100 Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy wrote: > However there are also some very harsh punishments handed out, such as > distrusting some CAs (most notably happened to Symantec and WoSign, > but others are also teetering), and distrusting auditors (most notably > hap

Re: How harsh (in general) should Mozilla be towards CAs?

2018-11-09 Thread westmail24--- via dev-security-policy
If Google had not started the process of Symantec distrust, Mozilla would never have come to this step, I think. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Re: How harsh (in general) should Mozilla be towards CAs?

2018-11-09 Thread Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
On 09/11/2018 12:44, westmai...@gmail.com wrote: I think that punishments of the CAs for already exists in Mozilla Root Store are very mild, and some CAs often do not pay any attention to this... However there are also some very harsh punishments handed out, such as distrusting some CAs (most

Re: How harsh (in general) should Mozilla be towards CAs?

2018-11-09 Thread westmail24--- via dev-security-policy
I think that punishments of the CAs for already exists in Mozilla Root Store are very mild, and some CAs often do not pay any attention to this... ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listin

Re: How harsh (in general) should Mozilla be towards CAs?

2018-11-08 Thread Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
On 09/11/2018 07:21, Ryan Sleevi wrote: On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 5:51 PM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: This thread is for the general principles, it takes no stance on any particular cases, as that would quickly derail the discussion. Over the

Re: How harsh (in general) should Mozilla be towards CAs?

2018-11-08 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 5:51 PM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > This thread is for the general principles, it takes no stance on any > particular cases, as that would quickly derail the discussion. > > Over the years, there has been some variatio

How harsh (in general) should Mozilla be towards CAs?

2018-11-08 Thread Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
This thread is for the general principles, it takes no stance on any particular cases, as that would quickly derail the discussion. Over the years, there has been some variation among participants in how harshly individual mistakes by CAs should be judged, ranging from "just file a satisfactory