Re: Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4 Inclusion Request

2019-10-17 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
Having received no further comments, I have recommended approval of this request in bug 1480510. - Wayne On Tue, Oct 8, 2019 at 4:23 PM Wayne Thayer wrote: > On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 9:09 AM Bruce via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > >> On Monday, July 29,

Re: Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4 Inclusion Request

2019-10-08 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 9:09 AM Bruce via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On Monday, July 29, 2019 at 5:22:19 PM UTC-4, Bruce wrote: > > > We will update section 4.2 and 9.12.3 in the next release of the CPS. > > The CPS Has been updated to address the above

Re: Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4 Inclusion Request

2019-10-07 Thread Bruce via dev-security-policy
On Monday, July 29, 2019 at 5:22:19 PM UTC-4, Bruce wrote: > We will update section 4.2 and 9.12.3 in the next release of the CPS. The CPS Has been updated to address the above issues, see

Re: Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4 Inclusion Request

2019-08-13 Thread Bruce via dev-security-policy
On Friday, July 26, 2019 at 1:25:13 PM UTC-4, Wayne Thayer wrote: > ==Bad== > * The most recent BR audit report lists two additional qualifications > related to the Network Security requirements: > ** During the Period, there were instances of some Certificate Systems not > undergoing a

Re: Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4 Inclusion Request

2019-08-02 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 9:59 AM Doug Beattie wrote: > Ryan, > > GlobalSign has been thinking along these lines, but it's not clear how > browsers build their path when a cross certificate is presented to them in > the TLS handshake. > Excellent! Happy to help in any way to make that possible and

RE: Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4 Inclusion Request

2019-08-02 Thread Doug Beattie via dev-security-policy
this approach? -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy Sent: Thursday, August 1, 2019 2:51 PM To: Bruce Cc: mozilla-dev-security-policy Subject: Re: Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4 Inclusion Request On Fri, Jul 26, 2019

Re: Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4 Inclusion Request

2019-08-01 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 4:29 PM Bruce via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On Friday, July 26, 2019 at 1:45:06 PM UTC-4, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > (In a personal capacity, as normally noted but making sure to extra-note > it > > here) > > > > Hi Wayne, > > > > It

Re: Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4 Inclusion Request

2019-07-29 Thread Bruce via dev-security-policy
On Friday, July 26, 2019 at 1:25:13 PM UTC-4, Wayne Thayer wrote: > ==Meh== > * BR section 2.2 requires section 4.2 of a CA’s CP and/or CPS to “clearly > specify the set of Issuer Domain Names that the CA recognises in CAA > "issue" or "issuewild" records as permitting it to issue.” The Entrust

Re: Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4 Inclusion Request

2019-07-26 Thread Bruce via dev-security-policy
On Friday, July 26, 2019 at 1:45:06 PM UTC-4, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > (In a personal capacity, as normally noted but making sure to extra-note it > here) > > Hi Wayne, > > It wasn't clear to me from the inclusion request, did Entrust give a reason > for the requested addition? For example, do they

Re: Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4 Inclusion Request

2019-07-26 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
(In a personal capacity, as normally noted but making sure to extra-note it here) Hi Wayne, It wasn't clear to me from the inclusion request, did Entrust give a reason for the requested addition? For example, do they plan to stop issuing from one of the included roots and have it removed? In