In what way would this be a policy violation? Most CAs trusted by
Mozilla issue wildcard certificates.
Perhaps you were thinking of EV certificates? For EV, wildcard is indeed
not permitted, but Let's Encrypt does not issue EV at all.
On 29/08/2017 04:31, David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
I just read mention that Let's Encrypt will be enabling wildcard
domains, possibly by the end of this year. Is this not a violation of
Mozilla policy?
I saw this in the eternal-september.support newsgroup, which is
available only via the news.eternal-september.org NNTP server. The
thread
On Friday, August 18, 2017 at 7:22:06 PM UTC-4, iden...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Thursday, August 17, 2017 at 2:35:15 PM UTC-4, Jonathan Rudenberg wrote:
> > > On Aug 17, 2017, at 14:24, identrust--- via dev-security-policy
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > Hello, In
Currently, CAA identifiers and problem reporting information are
collected on a per-CA basis and published in the "CA Information
Report"[1].
However, externally-operated sub-CAs generally have their own CAA
identifiers and problem reporting information, and this information
is not currently
I think that instead Ryan H is suggesting that (some) CAs are taking advantage
of multiple geographically distinct nodes to run the tests from one of the
Blessed Methods against an applicant's systems from several places on the
Internet at once. This mitigates against attacks that are able to
We released replacement notice in Chinese in our website:
https://www.wosign.com/news/announcement-about-Microsoft-Action-20170809.htm
https://www.wosign.com/news/announcement-about-Google-Action-20170710.htm
https://www.wosign.com/news/announcement_about_Mozilla_Action_20161024.htm
And we have
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