Re: CAA record checking issue

On Fri, 10 May 2019 02:05:17 + Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy wrote: > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1550645 > > Anyway, let me know what questions, comments, etc you have. Thanks Jeremy, If DigiCert is able to retrospectively achieve confidence that issuance would

RE: Certificates with subject stateOrProvinceName "Some-State"

Hi Alex, Thank you for reporting this issue. The certificate has been revoked. We will provide an incident report after the internal investigation is finished. Kind regards, Cristian Garabet  CISO Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

Certificates with subject stateOrProvinceName "Some-State"

Inspired by Nick Lamb's comment a week or so ago on m.d.s.p about "Default City" being an OpenSSL default value in CSRs, I ran some more searches on the OpenSSL defaults and found almost 100 certificates with a stateOrProvinceName of "Some-State". BR section 7.1.4.2.2(f) requires this field to be

Re: CAA record checking issue

This raised a question: How can CA prove they have done CAA checks or not at the time of issue? 在 2019年5月10日星期五 UTC+8上午10:05:36，Jeremy Rowley写道： > FYI, we posted this today: > > > > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1550645 > > > > Basically we discovered an issue with our

Re: Reported Digicert key compromise but not revoked

Thanks for that. So now I should send another email to rev...@digicert.com or just wait for revocation? And who should I contact if this address doesn't work? 在 2019年5月10日星期五 UTC+8上午8:26:09，Jeremy Rowley写道： > No argument from me there. We generally act on them no matter what. > Typically any

Re: Certinomis Issues

On Friday, 10 May 2019 19:00:11 UTC+2, Wayne Thayer wrote: ... > I share the concern that option #2 sends a confusing message. As Jonathan > stated, why should we distrust a CA for all but the most important websites > they secure? I'd say that both "too big to fail" and "too important to