GlobalSign: Failure to revoke certificate with compromised private key within 24 hours

2020-03-09 Thread Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
A certificate with a publicly-disclosed private key was reported to GlobalSign for revocation within the BR-mandated 24 hour period, however the revocation took place over 46 hours after the report was sent. Several requests for information I had already provided were made by GlobalSign, however

Re: GoDaddy: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificate within 24 hours

2020-03-09 Thread Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
Hi Joanna, Thanks for responding. When can this list, or Bugzilla, expect GoDaddy's incident report? Also, for the avoidance of further doubt, can you give an exact timestamp at which GoDaddy considers that evidence of key compromise was "obtained" for this certificate? - Matt On Mon, Mar 09,

Re: Request to Include Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2017 and to EV-enable Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009

2020-03-09 Thread Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
On Mon, Mar 09, 2020 at 11:48:40AM -0700, Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy wrote: > ==Bad== This is a *very* long list of bad things. Based on this list alone I think it would be reasonable for Mozilla to reject this application. I'd like to highlight the things that are practically

Re: GoDaddy: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificate within 24 hours

2020-03-09 Thread Joanna Fox via dev-security-policy
Matt, Thank you for sharing your experience with our problem reporting mechanism on this forum. It is due to this that we were able to get to the root of the issue. Here is some detail into what we saw. Yesterday, we launched an investigation which included various members of the team

Re: ssl.com: Certificate with Debian weak key

2020-03-09 Thread Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
On Sun, 8 Mar 2020 10:57:49 +1100 Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy wrote: > > The fingerpint of the claimed Debian weak key was not included in > > our database. > > I think it's worth determining exactly where SSL.com obtained their > fingerprint database of weak keys. The private key in

Request to Include Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2017 and to EV-enable Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009

2020-03-09 Thread Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
This request is for inclusion of the Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2017 trust anchor and to EV-enable the currently included Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009 trust anchor as documented in the following bug: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1445364 BR Self Assessment is here:

Re: ssl.com: Certificate with Debian weak key

2020-03-09 Thread Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy
On 07/03/2020 23:57, Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy wrote: As further independent confirmation, the crt.sh page for the certificate shows that crt.sh *also* identifies the certificate as having a Debian weak key. My understanding is that crt.sh uses a database of keys that was