Re: Policy 2.7.1: MRSP Issue #192: Require information about auditor qualifications in the audit report

2021-01-24 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
Here is my attempt to reword section 3.2 based on combining MRSP version 2.4.1 with version 2.7. My approach was to align the concepts of "competent", "independent" and "qualified" with their more-accepted meanings. Version 2.4.1 and earlier versions of the Mozilla Root Store Policy mixed some of

Re: Policy 2.7.1: MRSP Issue #187: Require disclosure of incidents in Audit Reports

2021-01-24 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
All, Based on the comments received, I am inclined to clarify the proposed language under Issues #154 and #187 with reference to a CA's Bugzilla compliance bugs rather than "incidents". The existing language in section 2.4 of the MRSP already requires the CA to promptly file an Incident Report

Re: Policy 2.7.1: MRSP Issue #186: Requirement to Disclose Self-signed Certificates

2021-01-24 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
As an alternative for this addition to MRSP section 5.3, please consider and comment on: Thus, the operator of a CA certificate trusted in Mozilla’s CA Certificate Program MUST disclose in the CCADB all non-technically constrained CA certificates they issue that chain up to that CA certificate

Re: MRSP Issue #147 - Require EV audits for certificates capable of issuing EV certificates

2021-01-24 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
In addition to the original proposal, I propose that we hyperlink "capable of issuing EV certificates" to https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/EV_Processing_for_CAs#EV_TLS_Capable. On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 11:23 AM Ben Wilson wrote: > > On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 2:03 AM Dimitris Zacharopoulos via >

Re: Policy 2.7.1: MRSP Issue #153: Cradle-to-Grave Contiguous Audits

2021-01-24 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
As proposed, changes to section 3.1.3 of the MRSP do not make any distinction between root CAs and subordinates. Nonetheless, what if we added this sentence to MRSP section 3.1.3, "This cradle-to-grave audit requirement applies equally to subordinate CAs as it does to root CAs."? If that does not

Re: Policy 2.7.1: MRSP Issue #152: Add EV Audit exception for Policy Constraints

2021-01-24 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
In line with the proposed hyperlink to https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/EV_Processing_for_CAs#EV_TLS_Capable from "capable of issuing EV certificates" (see Issue #147), then I don't think the proposed parenthetical is necessary anymore, and I think this issue can be considered resolved without needing

Re: Policy 2.7.1: MRSP Issue #153: Cradle-to-Grave Contiguous Audits

2021-01-24 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
I agree that we should add language that makes it more clear that the key destruction exception for audit only applies to the CA certificates whose key has been destroyed. I'm also hoping that a CAO wouldn't destroy a Root CA key if there were still valid subordinate CAs that the CAO might need

Re: Summary of Camerfirma's Compliance Issues

2021-01-24 Thread Ramiro Muñoz via dev-security-policy
El jueves, 3 de diciembre de 2020 a las 19:01:55 UTC+1, Ben Wilson escribió: > All, > > We have prepared an issues list as a summary of Camerfirma's compliance > issues over the past several years. The purpose of the list is to collect > and document all issues and responses in one place so

Re: Summary of Camerfirma's Compliance Issues

2021-01-24 Thread Watson Ladd via dev-security-policy
On Sunday, January 24, 2021 at 11:58:29 AM UTC-8, Ramiro Muñoz wrote: > > Thanks everyone for your valuable contribution to the discussion. We’ve > prepared a throughful Remediation Plan that addresses all areas of > improvement emerged both in this public discussion as well as direct contacts