Hi Nick
We attached an updated version of the affected certificate overview to the
bug on February 10, which does contain the date of order and date of
issuance.
Thanks
Arvid
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy
On
> Behalf Of Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
> Sent:
On Thursday, 11 February 2021 at 21:14:13 UTC, Ben Wilson wrote:
> 11. all incidents (as defined in section 2.4), including those reported in
> Bugzilla, that were:
> * disclosed by the CA or discovered by the auditor, and
> * unresolved at any time during the audit period;
>
> The idea is
I'm fine with that suggestion.
On Fri, Feb 12, 2021 at 5:06 AM malcol...--- via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On Thursday, 11 February 2021 at 21:14:13 UTC, Ben Wilson wrote:
> > 11. all incidents (as defined in section 2.4), including those reported
> in
All,
The proposed change currently reads,
"Full-surveillance period-of-time audits MUST be conducted and updated
audit information provided no less frequently than annually from the time
of CA key pair generation until the CA certificate is no longer trusted by
Mozilla's root store or until all
All,
On Monday, I'm going to recommend to Kathleen that we proceed with these
root inclusion requests of GlobalSign.
Please let us know if there are any concerns.
Thanks,
Ben
On Fri, Feb 12, 2021 at 7:31 AM Arvid Vermote via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
On Thu, 11 Feb 2021 15:12:46 -0500
Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> So I'd say feel free to ask your question there, which helps make
> sure it's answered before the issue is closed.
Good point. In this case Arvid has clarified that in fact the ticket
now has an updated sheet which
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