Re: Mandatory reasonCode analysis
On Thu, Oct 1, 2020 at 6:39 AM Corey Bonnell via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > Although RFC 5280, section 5 [2] mandates that conforming CAs MUST produce > v2 CRLs, the CAs issuing v1 CRLs pre-date any browser root requirements > that mandate adherence to the RFC 5280 profile. To clarify: You mean the CAs were issued prior to 2012, yet are still trusted? That seems an easy enough problem to fix, in the spirit of removing roots and hierarchies that predate the Baseline Requirements 1.0 effective date ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: Mandatory reasonCode analysis
I did some searching in this area after Microsoft announced the new root program requirement back in February [1] and it appears that v1 CRLs are still being actively published in the webPKI. Notably, v1 CRLs do not support extensions in revoked entries, so there is no way to encode the reasonCode extension. Although RFC 5280, section 5 [2] mandates that conforming CAs MUST produce v2 CRLs, the CAs issuing v1 CRLs pre-date any browser root requirements that mandate adherence to the RFC 5280 profile. Switching to v2 CRLs may present interoperability concerns for legacy clients that consume CRLs issued from such CAs. Additionally, RFC 5280 specifies that conforming clients must be able to consume both v1 and v2 CRLs, so modern clients should be able to consume v1 CRLs. Given the requirement as specified originally by Microsoft (and later in the BRs), I'd think that only v2 CRLs are acceptable moving forward but the potential legacy client interoperability issues may pose challenges with transitioning to v2 CRLs. I'm interested to hear if anyone has any thoughts on this. Thanks, Corey [1] https://cabforum.org/2020/03/20/minutes-for-ca-browser-forum-f2f-meeting-49-bratislava-19-20-february-2020/#Microsoft-Root-Program-Update [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-5 From: dev-security-policy on behalf of Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 11:58:45 AM To: dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Mandatory reasonCode analysis Starting today, the BRs require a reasonCode in CRLs and OCSP responses for revoked CA certificates. Since crt.sh already monitors CRLs and keeps track of reasonCodes, I thought I would conduct some analysis to determine the level of (non)compliance with these new rules. It's not clear to me if (1) the new BR rules should be applied only to CRLs and OCSP responses with thisUpdate timestamps dated today or afterwards, or if (2) every CRL and OCSP response currently being served by distribution points and responders (regardless of the thisUpdate timestamps) is required to comply. (I'd be interested to hear folks' opinions on this). This gist contains my crt.sh query, the results as .tsv, and a .zip containing all of the referenced CRLs: https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgist.github.com%2Frobstradling%2F3088dd622df8194d84244d4dd65ffd5fdata=02%7C01%7C%7Cfb1686dae6bf4f0475ea08d86559bf9b%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435%7C1%7C0%7C637370783420551771sdata=7kogxCZ1c%2F1ksbkNYEfMyP91gyIpJ8ppG%2F%2BOjevVl1Y%3Dreserved=0 -- Rob Stradling Senior Research & Development Scientist Email: r...@sectigo.com Bradford, UK Office: +441274024707 Sectigo Limited This message and any files associated with it may contain legally privileged, confidential, or proprietary information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are not permitted to use, copy, or forward it, in whole or in part without the express consent of the sender. Please notify the sender by reply email, disregard the foregoing messages, and delete it immediately. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.mozilla.org%2Flistinfo%2Fdev-security-policydata=02%7C01%7C%7Cfb1686dae6bf4f0475ea08d86559bf9b%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435%7C1%7C0%7C637370783420551771sdata=fkGX6tVkyTLHNtQkoiEdoF13ypjqCm6%2Ffq7FywIpa%2Fo%3Dreserved=0 ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: Mandatory reasonCode analysis
Hello, as we are in the "list of shame" and as a way to ensure we are following these discussions, I'd like to say that the OISTE CA that is referenced here (it's an old intermediate CA expiring in December 2020, and its CRL contains some unspecified revocations for Issuing CAs from 2015 and older) is under a root for which we already requested to remove the TLS trust bit to the different CA programs (e.g. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1653092), so now is out of the scope of BR. Best, Pedro ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: Mandatory reasonCode analysis
On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 12:56 PM Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > I also read this language: > > If a CRL entry is for a Certificate not subject to these Requirements > and was either issued on-or-after 2020-09-30 or has a notBefore on-or-after > 2020-09-30, the CRLReason MUST NOT be certificateHold (6). > > I think "was either issued on-or-after 2020-09-30 or has a notBefore > on-or-after 2020-09-30" is talking about "a Certificate not subject to > these Requirements", not about when the CRL was issued. > Yes. Yet another reason I think our approach to stating requirements in "plain English" does more harm than good. The correct parse tree: If a CRL entry is for: * a Certificate not subject to these Requirements; and * either: * was issued on-or-after 2020-09-30; or * has a notBefore on-or-after 2020-09-30 then: * the CRLReason MUST NOT be certificateHold (6). This was hoped to be "obvious", given that a "CRL entry" (a specific thing within a CRL, c.f. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-5.3 and X.509) is neither issued nor has a notBefore. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: Mandatory reasonCode analysis
Hi Doug. I didn't filter by any CRL fields, as per option (2) in my original post. From: Doug Beattie Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 17:53 To: Rob Stradling Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org Subject: RE: Mandatory reasonCode analysis Hi Rob, I'm not sure you filtered this report by "thisUpdate", maybe you did it by nextUpdate by mistake? The GlobalSign CRL on this report was created in 2016, thus the question. Doug -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy On Behalf Of Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 11:59 AM To: dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Mandatory reasonCode analysis Starting today, the BRs require a reasonCode in CRLs and OCSP responses for revoked CA certificates. Since crt.sh already monitors CRLs and keeps track of reasonCodes, I thought I would conduct some analysis to determine the level of (non)compliance with these new rules. It's not clear to me if (1) the new BR rules should be applied only to CRLs and OCSP responses with thisUpdate timestamps dated today or afterwards, or if (2) every CRL and OCSP response currently being served by distribution points and responders (regardless of the thisUpdate timestamps) is required to comply. (I'd be interested to hear folks' opinions on this). This gist contains my crt.sh query, the results as .tsv, and a .zip containing all of the referenced CRLs: https://gist.github.com/robstradling/3088dd622df8194d84244d4dd65ffd5f -- Rob Stradling Senior Research & Development Scientist Email: r...@sectigo.com Bradford, UK Office: +441274024707 Sectigo Limited This message and any files associated with it may contain legally privileged, confidential, or proprietary information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are not permitted to use, copy, or forward it, in whole or in part without the express consent of the sender. Please notify the sender by reply email, disregard the foregoing messages, and delete it immediately. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
RE: Mandatory reasonCode analysis
That's probably true since CRL entries are published instead of issued and they don't have a notBefore date. Regardless, I can see why someone would read it as requiring an update for all next published CRLs/OCSP given the historical way the BRs worked. To be safe, we did update all of the DigiCert CRLs/OCSP for ICAs capable of issuing TLS. Looks like your report is flagging the legacy Symantec ICAs that are no longer trusted for TLS and are part of a root removal request. From: Rob Stradling Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 10:56 AM To: Mozilla ; Jeremy Rowley Subject: Re: Mandatory reasonCode analysis > I also read this language: > If a CRL entry is for a Certificate not subject to these Requirements and was > either issued on-or-after 2020-09-30 or has a notBefore on-or-after > 2020-09-30, the CRLReason MUST NOT be certificateHold (6). I think "was either issued on-or-after 2020-09-30 or has a notBefore on-or-after 2020-09-30" is talking about "a Certificate not subject to these Requirements", not about when the CRL was issued. From: dev-security-policy mailto:dev-security-policy-boun...@lists.mozilla.org>> on behalf of Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy mailto:dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org>> Sent: 30 September 2020 17:41 To: Mozilla mailto:mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org>> Subject: RE: Mandatory reasonCode analysis CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. This is a good question. I read the requirements as applying only to CRLs and OCSP published after the effective date since the BRs always say explicitly when they apply to items before the effective date. I also read this language: If a CRL entry is for a Certificate not subject to these Requirements and was either issued on-or-after 2020-09-30 or has a notBefore on-or-after 2020-09-30, the CRLReason MUST NOT be certificateHold (6). Which made me think the language applied only to CRLs and OCSP issued after 9-30. However, the language does only reference certificateHold and not the inclusion of reasonCode language. That was the analysis I had anyway - that any CRLs and OCSP published after 9-30 had to have reasonCode. -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy mailto:dev-security-policy-boun...@lists.mozilla.org>> On Behalf Of Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 9:59 AM To: dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org<mailto:dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> Subject: Mandatory reasonCode analysis Starting today, the BRs require a reasonCode in CRLs and OCSP responses for revoked CA certificates. Since crt.sh already monitors CRLs and keeps track of reasonCodes, I thought I would conduct some analysis to determine the level of (non)compliance with these new rules. It's not clear to me if (1) the new BR rules should be applied only to CRLs and OCSP responses with thisUpdate timestamps dated today or afterwards, or if (2) every CRL and OCSP response currently being served by distribution points and responders (regardless of the thisUpdate timestamps) is required to comply. (I'd be interested to hear folks' opinions on this). This gist contains my crt.sh query, the results as .tsv, and a .zip containing all of the referenced CRLs: https://gist.github.com/robstradling/3088dd622df8194d84244d4dd65ffd5f -- Rob Stradling Senior Research & Development Scientist Email: r...@sectigo.com<mailto:r...@sectigo.com> Bradford, UK Office: +441274024707 Sectigo Limited This message and any files associated with it may contain legally privileged, confidential, or proprietary information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are not permitted to use, copy, or forward it, in whole or in part without the express consent of the sender. Please notify the sender by reply email, disregard the foregoing messages, and delete it immediately. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org<mailto:dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org<mailto:dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: Mandatory reasonCode analysis
> I also read this language: > If a CRL entry is for a Certificate not subject to these Requirements and was > either issued on-or-after 2020-09-30 or has a notBefore on-or-after > 2020-09-30, the CRLReason MUST NOT be certificateHold (6). I think "was either issued on-or-after 2020-09-30 or has a notBefore on-or-after 2020-09-30" is talking about "a Certificate not subject to these Requirements", not about when the CRL was issued. From: dev-security-policy on behalf of Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy Sent: 30 September 2020 17:41 To: Mozilla Subject: RE: Mandatory reasonCode analysis CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. This is a good question. I read the requirements as applying only to CRLs and OCSP published after the effective date since the BRs always say explicitly when they apply to items before the effective date. I also read this language: If a CRL entry is for a Certificate not subject to these Requirements and was either issued on-or-after 2020-09-30 or has a notBefore on-or-after 2020-09-30, the CRLReason MUST NOT be certificateHold (6). Which made me think the language applied only to CRLs and OCSP issued after 9-30. However, the language does only reference certificateHold and not the inclusion of reasonCode language. That was the analysis I had anyway - that any CRLs and OCSP published after 9-30 had to have reasonCode. -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy On Behalf Of Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 9:59 AM To: dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Mandatory reasonCode analysis Starting today, the BRs require a reasonCode in CRLs and OCSP responses for revoked CA certificates. Since crt.sh already monitors CRLs and keeps track of reasonCodes, I thought I would conduct some analysis to determine the level of (non)compliance with these new rules. It's not clear to me if (1) the new BR rules should be applied only to CRLs and OCSP responses with thisUpdate timestamps dated today or afterwards, or if (2) every CRL and OCSP response currently being served by distribution points and responders (regardless of the thisUpdate timestamps) is required to comply. (I'd be interested to hear folks' opinions on this). This gist contains my crt.sh query, the results as .tsv, and a .zip containing all of the referenced CRLs: https://gist.github.com/robstradling/3088dd622df8194d84244d4dd65ffd5f -- Rob Stradling Senior Research & Development Scientist Email: r...@sectigo.com Bradford, UK Office: +441274024707 Sectigo Limited This message and any files associated with it may contain legally privileged, confidential, or proprietary information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are not permitted to use, copy, or forward it, in whole or in part without the express consent of the sender. Please notify the sender by reply email, disregard the foregoing messages, and delete it immediately. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
RE: Mandatory reasonCode analysis
Hi Rob, I'm not sure you filtered this report by "thisUpdate", maybe you did it by nextUpdate by mistake? The GlobalSign CRL on this report was created in 2016, thus the question. Doug -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy On Behalf Of Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 11:59 AM To: dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Mandatory reasonCode analysis Starting today, the BRs require a reasonCode in CRLs and OCSP responses for revoked CA certificates. Since crt.sh already monitors CRLs and keeps track of reasonCodes, I thought I would conduct some analysis to determine the level of (non)compliance with these new rules. It's not clear to me if (1) the new BR rules should be applied only to CRLs and OCSP responses with thisUpdate timestamps dated today or afterwards, or if (2) every CRL and OCSP response currently being served by distribution points and responders (regardless of the thisUpdate timestamps) is required to comply. (I'd be interested to hear folks' opinions on this). This gist contains my crt.sh query, the results as .tsv, and a .zip containing all of the referenced CRLs: https://gist.github.com/robstradling/3088dd622df8194d84244d4dd65ffd5f -- Rob Stradling Senior Research & Development Scientist Email: r...@sectigo.com Bradford, UK Office: +441274024707 Sectigo Limited This message and any files associated with it may contain legally privileged, confidential, or proprietary information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are not permitted to use, copy, or forward it, in whole or in part without the express consent of the sender. Please notify the sender by reply email, disregard the foregoing messages, and delete it immediately. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
RE: Mandatory reasonCode analysis
This is a good question. I read the requirements as applying only to CRLs and OCSP published after the effective date since the BRs always say explicitly when they apply to items before the effective date. I also read this language: If a CRL entry is for a Certificate not subject to these Requirements and was either issued on-or-after 2020-09-30 or has a notBefore on-or-after 2020-09-30, the CRLReason MUST NOT be certificateHold (6). Which made me think the language applied only to CRLs and OCSP issued after 9-30. However, the language does only reference certificateHold and not the inclusion of reasonCode language. That was the analysis I had anyway - that any CRLs and OCSP published after 9-30 had to have reasonCode. -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy On Behalf Of Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 9:59 AM To: dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Mandatory reasonCode analysis Starting today, the BRs require a reasonCode in CRLs and OCSP responses for revoked CA certificates. Since crt.sh already monitors CRLs and keeps track of reasonCodes, I thought I would conduct some analysis to determine the level of (non)compliance with these new rules. It's not clear to me if (1) the new BR rules should be applied only to CRLs and OCSP responses with thisUpdate timestamps dated today or afterwards, or if (2) every CRL and OCSP response currently being served by distribution points and responders (regardless of the thisUpdate timestamps) is required to comply. (I'd be interested to hear folks' opinions on this). This gist contains my crt.sh query, the results as .tsv, and a .zip containing all of the referenced CRLs: https://gist.github.com/robstradling/3088dd622df8194d84244d4dd65ffd5f -- Rob Stradling Senior Research & Development Scientist Email: r...@sectigo.com Bradford, UK Office: +441274024707 Sectigo Limited This message and any files associated with it may contain legally privileged, confidential, or proprietary information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are not permitted to use, copy, or forward it, in whole or in part without the express consent of the sender. Please notify the sender by reply email, disregard the foregoing messages, and delete it immediately. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Mandatory reasonCode analysis
Starting today, the BRs require a reasonCode in CRLs and OCSP responses for revoked CA certificates. Since crt.sh already monitors CRLs and keeps track of reasonCodes, I thought I would conduct some analysis to determine the level of (non)compliance with these new rules. It's not clear to me if (1) the new BR rules should be applied only to CRLs and OCSP responses with thisUpdate timestamps dated today or afterwards, or if (2) every CRL and OCSP response currently being served by distribution points and responders (regardless of the thisUpdate timestamps) is required to comply. (I'd be interested to hear folks' opinions on this). This gist contains my crt.sh query, the results as .tsv, and a .zip containing all of the referenced CRLs: https://gist.github.com/robstradling/3088dd622df8194d84244d4dd65ffd5f -- Rob Stradling Senior Research & Development Scientist Email: r...@sectigo.com Bradford, UK Office: +441274024707 Sectigo Limited This message and any files associated with it may contain legally privileged, confidential, or proprietary information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are not permitted to use, copy, or forward it, in whole or in part without the express consent of the sender. Please notify the sender by reply email, disregard the foregoing messages, and delete it immediately. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
