Re: Proposal for a standard proof of compromised key/revocation request format

2020-08-12 Thread Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
On Wed, Aug 12, 2020 at 06:25:00PM -0700, cbon...--- via dev-security-policy wrote: > > I'm yet to have a CA baulk at accepting a CSR as proof of compromise. It > > has the benefit of not having nearly as many superfluous fields as a > > certificate, as well. In terms of being able to deal with

Re: Proposal for a standard proof of compromised key/revocation request format

2020-06-28 Thread Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
On Sun, Jun 28, 2020 at 05:14:47AM -0700, Corey Bonnell via dev-security-policy wrote: > Feedback and suggestions for improvements are greatly appreciated. Even > if this format is not adopted as a standard mechanism for providing proof > of key compromise, I hope that by posting it here there