seccomp tangle

2020-02-23 Thread Hal Murray via devel
[Was Subject: Re: Is there a clean way for waf to test for the distro?] > Are you really, absolutely, positively sure that you can't check for the > feature itself directly. If you start going down the distro-checking path, > things get very messy, very fast. For example, is "Linux Mint" like Ub

Seccomp tangle

2020-05-25 Thread Hal Murray via devel
I've been experimenting with some code to allow custom scccomp lists. The idea is to replace the --enable-seccomp configure option with --enable-seccomp=foo and ntp_sandbox would include syscomp/foo.c which would be a list of syscalls used by this system. I assume we would maintain a list fo

Re: seccomp tangle

2020-02-23 Thread Eric S. Raymond via devel
Hal Murray via devel : > Should we drop secomp? It's a pain to maintain. We're a security-focused prodict. I don't think it would be good optics to drop a layer of defense just because it's a pain to maintain. > How many people use it? Richard: do you turn it on for the Debian builds? I have

Re: seccomp tangle

2020-02-24 Thread Hal Murray via devel
e...@thyrsus.com said: [dropping seccomp] > We're a security-focused prodict. I don't think it would be good optics to > drop a layer of defense just because it's a pain to maintain. Have you considered the lost opportunity cost? This current approach of tossing everything in gives is braggin

Re: seccomp tangle

2020-02-25 Thread Richard Laager via devel
On 2/23/20 4:59 AM, Hal Murray via devel wrote: > Should we drop secomp? It's a pain to maintain. I wouldn't cry. > How many people use it? Richard: do you turn it on for the Debian builds? I do not. It seems really fragile to me. A change in an underlying library can break a working binary, p

Re: seccomp tangle

2020-02-25 Thread ASSI via devel
Richard Laager via devel writes: > I do not. It seems really fragile to me. A change in an underlying > library can break a working binary, possibly only in some scenarios. > That's scary. It's also somewhat the point of using it: any un-audited change rather breaks the application than the system

Re: seccomp tangle

2020-02-26 Thread Hal Murray via devel
Richard said: > I do not. It seems really fragile to me. A change in an underlying library > can break a working binary, possibly only in some scenarios. That's scary. > It'd be safer (but still not completely safe) to enable if I had good (or > any) "as installed" tests using Debian's autopkgt

Re: Seccomp tangle

2020-05-26 Thread Eric S. Raymond via devel
Hal Murray via devel : > > I've been experimenting with some code to allow custom scccomp lists. > > The idea is to replace the --enable-seccomp configure option with > --enable-seccomp=foo > and ntp_sandbox would include syscomp/foo.c which would be a list of syscalls > used by this system. >

Re: Seccomp tangle

2020-05-26 Thread Hal Murray via devel
e...@thyrsus.com said: >> If yes, I'll need some help to work out the details. > Aaarrgghhh. It;s a huge pain in the ass and I wish it weren't interesting. > But given our mission statememnnt, it has to be. OK. Let's discuss how to do it. I was thinking of putting the individual lists in ntp

Re: Seccomp tangle

2020-05-26 Thread Gary E. Miller via devel
Yo Hal! On Tue, 26 May 2020 18:23:55 -0700 Hal Murray via devel wrote: > I was thinking of putting the individual lists in ntpd/seccomp/ > with something like > #include "seccomp/foo.c" > in ntp_sandbox. Why not just load a text file at runtime during startup? seccomp does not protect agains

Re: Seccomp tangle

2020-05-27 Thread Hal Murray via devel
e...@thyrsus.com said: > Aaarrgghhh. It;s a huge pain in the ass and I wish it weren't interesting. > But given our mission statememnnt, it has to be. Just to make sure we are on the same wavelength... My question/proposal was not to drop seccomp if we didn't do what I sketched out. It was

Re: Seccomp tangle

2020-05-27 Thread Eric S. Raymond via devel
Hal Murray : > The first quirk is that ntpd isn't on the #include search path. > (My hack was to put a link from include to ntpd/seccomp) > What's the right way to handle this? (Maybe I just fatfingered things.) Generating the requred stuff into include, where all the headers live, ought to work.

Re: Seccomp tangle

2020-05-27 Thread Eric S. Raymond via devel
Hal Murray : > > e...@thyrsus.com said: > > Aaarrgghhh. It;s a huge pain in the ass and I wish it weren't interesting. > > But given our mission statememnnt, it has to be. > > Just to make sure we are on the same wavelength... > > My question/proposal was not to drop seccomp if we didn't do wh

seccomp tangle - Alpine Linux

2020-09-04 Thread Hal Murray via devel
I don't know what changed to trigger this. I assume you can't easily test on Alpine, so I poked around a bit. It's working after the edit below. I don't know if this will break on some other system. Probably not. These look like vanilla system calls. Some syscalls don't exist on some syst