Re: [freenet-dev] [freenet-cvs] r21351 - in trunk/apps/new_installer: res/unix/bin scripts

2008-07-24 Thread Daniel Cheng
On Thu, Jul 24, 2008 at 4:09 AM, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Author: nextgens > Date: 2008-07-23 20:09:00 + (Wed, 23 Jul 2008) > New Revision: 21351 > [...] > Modified: trunk/apps/new_installer/res/unix/bin/install_stun.sh > ===

[freenet-dev] Proposed solutions so far was Re: Friend-of-a-friend routing

2008-07-24 Thread Matthew Toseland
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[freenet-dev] Proposed solutions so far was Re: Friend-of-a-friend routing

2008-07-24 Thread Volodya
Matthew Toseland wrote: > 3) Limit any single node to no more than 30% of our outgoing requests. This > would help in that getting 100% of a node's outgoing requests wouldn't be > possible... but it wouldn't solve the problem. If an attacker's objective is > to capture all the locally originated

Re: [freenet-dev] Proposed solutions so far was Re: Friend-of-a-friend routing

2008-07-24 Thread Matthew Toseland
On Thursday 24 July 2008 10:15, Volodya wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > > 3) Limit any single node to no more than 30% of our outgoing requests. This > > would help in that getting 100% of a node's outgoing requests wouldn't be > > possible... but it wouldn't solve the problem. If an attacker

Re: [freenet-dev] Proposed solutions so far was Re: Friend-of-a-friend routing

2008-07-24 Thread Volodya
Matthew Toseland wrote: > 3) Limit any single node to no more than 30% of our outgoing requests. This > would help in that getting 100% of a node's outgoing requests wouldn't be > possible... but it wouldn't solve the problem. If an attacker's objective is > to capture all the locally originated