On Thursday 24 July 2008 10:15, Volodya wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > > 3) Limit any single node to no more than 30% of our outgoing requests. This > > would help in that getting 100% of a node's outgoing requests wouldn't be > > possible... but it wouldn't solve the problem. If an attacker's objective is > > to capture all the locally originated traffic, he just needs to grab as big a > > part of the keyspace as possible, excluding the target's specialisation as > > most of its non-local requests will be in that area. > > I am sorry if i'm just being stupid, but what if a person uses darknet with 3 > friends only, each would get 33% and disconnect? Shouldn't this be in relation > to how many nodes you connect to?
Yes, it would be disabled for less than 5 peers. For the paranoid we might have an option to not send requests unless we are able to satisfy this criterion (so we don't end up sending all our traffic through Mallory just because he's the only node that isn't backed off, because he DoS'ed the others!). -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20080724/c8a1c04d/attachment.pgp>
