Re: [DNSOP] CloudFlare policy on ANY records changing

2015-03-14 Thread Evan Hunt
On Sat, Mar 14, 2015 at 09:10:03PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote: > We'd have to be reasonably sure that no resolver treats is as a > meta-type and turns the upstream response into a FORMERR upon seeing > it in the answer section. “NULLs are used as placeholders in some > experimental extensions of

Re: [DNSOP] Call for Adoption: draft-ogud-dnsop-acl-metaqueries

2015-03-14 Thread Florian Weimer
* Tim Wicinski: > This starts a Call for Adoption for draft-ogud-dnsop-acl-metaqueries > > The draft is available here: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ogud-dnsop-acl-metaqueries/ No real comments on adoptions below, just some technical issues. Is there are definition now what constitut

Re: [DNSOP] CloudFlare policy on ANY records changing

2015-03-14 Thread Florian Weimer
* Tony Finch: >> Evan Hunt wrote: >> > >> > This could be a pretty brilliant solution, actually: If you're >> > authoritative for a signed zone and you receive a query of type ANY, >> > return the applicable NSEC/NSEC3; if the zone is *not* signed, synthesize >> > a response containing a single R

Re: [DNSOP] CloudFlare policy on ANY records changing

2015-03-14 Thread Florian Weimer
* Evan Hunt: > (It doesn't address qmail's problem, but that's a lost cause no > matter which method is chosen.) I think it does. qmail already copes correctly with a partially cached ANY response (due to TTL mismatch between RRset), does it? The new behavior just looks like a partially cached r

Re: [DNSOP] CloudFlare policy on ANY records changing

2015-03-14 Thread Florian Weimer
* Evan Hunt: > On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 11:38:04PM +, Darcy Kevin (FCA) wrote: >> So you're thinking it's more likely that we'll get folks to understand >> this new type, that's designed to frustrate QTYPE=* queries in a >> more-or-less graceful way, than it is to convince them to stop making >

Re: [DNSOP] [dns-operations] dnsop-any-notimp violates the DNS standards

2015-03-14 Thread Nicholas Weaver
> On Mar 13, 2015, at 7:59 PM, Paul Vixie wrote: > > Nicholas Weaver Saturday, March 14, 2015 5:07 AM >> >>> ... >>> >>> Overall, unless you are validating on the end host rather than the >>> recursive resolver, DNSSEC does a lot of harm from misconfiguration-DOS, >>> but almost no good.