Fix integer overflow vulnerabilities in fbcon_do_set_font() where font
size calculations could overflow when handling user-controlled font
parameters.

The vulnerabilities occur when:
1. CALC_FONTSZ(h, pitch, charcount) performs h * pith * charcount
   multiplication with user-controlled values that can overflow.
2. FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int) + size addition can also overflow
3. This results in smaller allocations than expected, leading to buffer
   overflows during font data copying.

Add explicit overflow checking using check_mul_overflow() and
check_add_overflow() kernel helpers to safety validate all size
calculations before allocation.

Signed-off-by: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ana...@oracle.com>
---
 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c
index 55f5731e94c3..a507d05f8fea 100644
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c
@@ -2531,9 +2531,16 @@ static int fbcon_set_font(struct vc_data *vc, const 
struct console_font *font,
        if (fbcon_invalid_charcount(info, charcount))
                return -EINVAL;
 
-       size = CALC_FONTSZ(h, pitch, charcount);
+       /* Check for integer overflow in font size calculation */
+       if (check_mul_overflow(h, pitch, &size) ||
+           check_mul_overflow(size, charcount, &size))
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       /* Check for overflow in allocation size calculation */
+       if (check_add_overflow(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int), size, &size))
+               return -EINVAL;
 
-       new_data = kmalloc(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int) + size, GFP_USER);
+       new_data = kmalloc(size, GFP_USER);
 
        if (!new_data)
                return -ENOMEM;
-- 
2.50.1

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