>
Having, supposedly, convinced me that voting is not worth doing, you
propose forcing me to do this useless task.
Makes no sense. However, I reject your arithmetic.
--voting is not worth doing for an individual. Name me just a single time
your vote has ever affected an election result (for a
On Fri, 21 Oct 2005 18:24:36 -0400 Warren Smith wrote:
> If there is no compulsory voting, then
> it makes no real sense to vote. Logically.
> Because the benefit you get from voting is
> the chance you will create or break a tie, time
> the benefit of the resultign election-result
> change to yo
Mike wrote (see below for context):
"Sure, the A and B voters have to choose whether to help eachother or
compete
with eachother, and if one competes and one helps, then that faction is
being had. If they both compete, they both lose.
That's the co-operation/defection problem, as it occurs in vo
Jim--
Thanks for the interesting and problematic example.
The real problem there is the co-operation/defection problem that has been
discussed on EM a few times. It's usually discussed in terms of Approval,
though the problem can happen in Condorcet as an order-reversal problem (if
the ATLO o
Mike Ossippoff wrote:
>
>
> Forest--
>
> You wrote:
>
> If you use a range style ballot, and just go down one slot
> per Bucklin move,
> then you could discard the majority defeated candidates. It
> might help
> mitigate the Clone Winner problem, too.
>
> I reply:
>
> But wouldn't that l
Mike is correct. Bucklin with equal rankings and truncation allowed is
equivalent to ratings and does not require the complication in voting and
counting that ratings introduces.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> MIKE OSSIPOFF
> Sen
Forest--
You wrote:
The candidate with the maximum median rating is the ER Bucklin (whole)
winner, assuming that if two candidates have the same median rating R > 0,
then the one at or above R on the most ballots is the winner.
I reply:
Well that certainly answers my question, when I asked w
Forest--
You wrote:
If you use a range style ballot, and just go down one slot per Bucklin move,
then you could discard the majority defeated candidates. It might help
mitigate the Clone Winner problem, too.
I reply:
But wouldn't that lose the method's FBC compliance? For FBC compliance, i
First let me re-state the definition of MDDB.
It's the same as MDDA, except that it uses SR instead of Approval.
MDDB:
A candidate is disqualified if another candidate is ranked over him/her by a
majority of the voters.
(Unless that would disqualify all the candidates, in which case no one is
If there is no compulsory voting, then
it makes no real sense to vote. Logically.
Because the benefit you get from voting is
the chance you will create or break a tie, time
the benefit of the resultign election-result
change to you personally. In large elections,
do the arithmetic to conclude th
Mike Ossippoff wrote: (see below for full text)
I reply:
I agree. Most any method is acceptable then, except for Borda, which in its
standard form, forces you to rank all the candidates.
This is not an accurate description of what Count de Borda wrote. In its
"standard form" Borda says "
You'd said:
Can happen that I desire electing Tom and hate Harry. Further, I am not
sure Tom can win so, in case he loses (and only if he loses), I want to do
what I can to make sure Dick gets in as my second choice.
You add:
Let me expand on this. There is a race for mayor in a city near h
More words than ideas, but I am trying to read it all - and did.
Started this where Abd misused the word absentee and Anthony correctly
noted that proxy fit the circumstances better.
Then Abd mentioned his favorite, "Delegable proxy" - for which I like his
intent, but Anthony objects as to deta
Abd ulRahman Lomax wrote:
And now we come to the crux:
>Democracy is a form of "rule".
That's it in a nutshell. Democracy, per se, is not a form of rule,
for coercion is not intrinsic to democracy; rather, coercion may be
necessary under conditions where full democ
See below
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Dave Ketchum
> Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2005 7:38 PM
> Do you have to go back and look at the ballots after deciding
> on value of
> R? Gets messy with many ballots such as for go
I thought this example might be of some interest. I'm not certain of
its import. I'll give the example first and append my comments.
Range Voting with range 0-10; seven alternatives A, B, C, D, E, F, G;
100 voters. Sincere (whatever that means) ratings are given in the table
below, whose last lin
Kevin,
You are right, I erred. MDD,ER-Bucklin(Whole) doesn't meet
Smith(Gross), so scrub that and replace
it with "Condorcet(Gross)".
Douglas Woodall gives this demonstration:
49: a>b>c>d>i>j>k>e>f>g>h
31: e>f>g>h>j>k>i>a>b>c>d
20: k>i>j>a>b>c>d>e>f>g>h
>The Smith set is {i,j,k} (beating
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