It's a chaotic system, in that there is no precise, neat, structureset up in advance. However, the human nervous system is organized
pretty much like this, from the ground up.How about joining Metaparty?(And you can be sure that most of us will support other efforts thatfollow similar principles. O
At 12:03 AM 6/29/2006, Damien Morton wrote:
>I had a revelation recently about a new kind of political party that
>might well have a chance of succeeding in a two-party democracy.
You have seen something that resembles what some others have seen, in
certain ways, and not in others. Some of what y
Allen Pulsifer wrote:
> Going back to the example I gave, the Condorcet majority that elected D was
> made up of everyone who did not rank A the highest, i.e., the Not A's, and
> they all coalesced around D. In reality a coalition like that would never
> happen and if it did, it could not be held
Any time that IRV does not elect the sincere CW (when there is one) there is
going to be a strong incentive for order reversal under IRV, except under the
(non-existent) zero information case. [The only real life cases that exist in
hot elections are the positive information and positive disinf
I think people in America and so many other places are attached to the SMD system because they feel it provides them with a member of congress whom they can always respond to. People don't often realize that this is true to the people who don't want that candidate in office. The mixed member part
Hi Rob,
> > Getting back to Condorcet, there is a majority in each pair-wise
> > comparison, but for each pair, it is a different set of
> > voters. There is no way, at the end of the election, to go back and say
> > "This is the majority that elected the winner".
>
> Sure there is, and it's
On Wed, 28 Jun 2006 22:00:15 -0400 Allen Pulsifer wrote:
> Hello Dave,
>
> There are a few things I like about IRV as opposed to Condorcet.
>
> First, I think IRV is a reasonably straight-forward extension of current
> runoff methods. I think it will be more readily understood and accepted.
> I
Hi,
I have some generic comments on demonstrating
vulnerabilities of different voting methods.
There is no problem free method and on this list I
have seen numerous demonstrations of theoretical
vulnerabilities of (probably) all the proposed
methods. In most cases those demonstrations do not
conv
It seems to me that the framework and the results are underdeveloped,
or at least poorly documented, for evaluating the overall
possibilities for strategic voting for any specific election method.
Criteria have been developed for characterizing election methods
about the results they produce when
Allen wrote:
> Yes, it looks like you proposed the same thing back in 2002.
> What became of your proposal? ;-)
Some members of the instantrunoff-freewheeling group were arguing for the
superiority of IRV over Condorcet. Double IRV was one of my attempts to
seduce them to the Condorcet side. Suc
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