From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Does anyone have any comments in reference to this critique of STV as
applied to choosing three pizza toppings? The issue is whether it's
fair
to transfer the surplus votes from the winners before transfering
votes
from the losers.
In PR-STV, the number of
Nathan Larson asked:
Does anyone have any comments in reference to this critique
of STV as applied to choosing three pizza toppings? The issue
is whether it's fair to transfer the surplus votes from the
winners before transferring votes from the losers.
The person who wrote the
Hello,
I was thinking recently about how one might design a method aimed to
minimize potential for regret at least for supporters of the median
candidate. By regret I mean especially the situation that supporters
of the median candidate give the election away by voting also for a
second
Juho Laatu:
I think Range Voting is quite ok for opinion polls and corresponding
fully non-contentious elections (e.g. www.imdb.com), but as soon as
there is an element of competition Approval style voting is the
likely outcome.
--the exit poll we made of the 2004 US Presidential election,
Jonathan Lundell Sent: 13 November 2006 16:27
At 11:37 AM + 11/13/06, James Gilmour wrote:
Rather, STV-PR was devised to
ensure that each significant point of view within the electorate was
represented fairly (as expressed by the voters' responses to the
candidates who had offered
On Nov 13, 2006, at 20:13 , Warren Smith wrote:
Juho Laatu:
I think Range Voting is quite ok for opinion polls and corresponding
fully non-contentious elections (e.g. www.imdb.com), but as soon as
there is an element of competition Approval style voting is the
likely outcome.
--the exit
Laatu:
You used the same word poll that I used. People obviously 1) didn't
have any major reason to try to force the results in any direction
and 2) probably were not told and did not understand the strategic
possibilities of Range Voting. People may also typically want to
answer sincerely
Hybrid method:
Method is STV except that, if the ranks are exhausted, the vote
becomes an asset of the candidate in first rank, to be reassigned as
that candidate chooses.
The same concept could be used for Condorcet methods.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
