I honestly didn't know that (though I should have realized such a simple
idea would already be in use somewhere). I'll have to check out Above the
line voting. Thanks!
Michael Rouse
James Gilmour wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: 06 January 2007 16:39
One partial solution is to require all
On Sat, 6 Jan 2007 08:39:19 -0800 (PST) [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Many vote aggregation methods have a problem with bullet voting, truncated
ballots, and multiple candidates ranked the same on a single ballot. A
voter should not obtain a better result by *not* showing a preference, but
neither
IEVS ran for a few days using honest voters and random normal utilities.
I have now also implemented Venzke's vote for and against method (which is
not
the same as mine) under the name VenzkeDisqPlur; and
Condorcet//Approval and UncoveredSet, bringing us up to 39 voting methods.
(Your
Sorry, I forgot last post to say the IEVS source code is available as usual at
http://rangevoting.org/IEVS/IEVS.c
Warren D Smith
http://rangevoting.org
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Simmons, Forest wrote:
Here's a version that is both clone proof and monotonic:
The winner is the alternative A with the smallest number of ballots on which
alternatives that beat A pairwise are ranked in first place. [shared first
place slots are counted fractionally]
That's it.
This
