Juho says:
This kind of differences could also explain some unexplainable differences
in the attitudes on strategic voting on this list :-).
I reply:
No, it can explain them if theyre unexplainable. But it might explain them
if theyre _otherwise_ unexplainable.
I dont know what you
On Feb 27, 2007, at 11:46 , Michael Ossipoff wrote:
But your smiley suggests that my examples are not what you mean by
“real life example”s. Well, since margins isn’t in use anywhere, it
would be difficult to find real life examples. All one can do is
show what can happen.
Well,
On Feb 27, 2007, at 17:36 , Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I don’t know what you mean by “attitudes”.
I gave two rather extreme attitude examples (with the intention to
define the discussion space)
1) In some countries strategic voting may be taken as granted and
voters may expect to be given
I commend Jobst for his essay [
http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-February/019584.html
] on utilities. It helps clarify some issues about utilities and the
often abused notion of social utilities.
Utility functions are just a way of representing
How to define individual utility in election methods is not
necessarily a problem: the voter defines it. They system provides a
means to express such utilities.
Aggregating utilities, however, is obviously not such a simple thing.
But we should not let this distract us from the fact that
