Forest--
Alright, but the C voters are still truncating their approval, arent they?
They still need that strategy in order to put the choice to the A voters
about accepting the Nash equilibrium or else. True, the C voters dont have
to abandon A to the degree that theyd have to in wv. So
Warren, by writing I direct your attention to puzzle xy you unfortunately
fail to do just that. Either post what you want to say or leave it.
-Ursprüngliche Nachricht-
Von: Warren Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Gesendet: 02.03.07 19:06:25
An: Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Betreff:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax writes:
Okay, that rarity of rarities, an original post by me.
A great deal of criticism of voting methods is based on how the
methods behave with strategic voters, those who vote insincerely to
gain some presumably favorable outcome.
However, if we assume sincere
Forest W Simmons wrote:
UncAAO stands for Uncovered, Approval, Approval Opposition. Here's how
it works:
For each candidate X,
if X is uncovered,
then let f(X)=X,
else let f(X) be the candidate against which X has the least approval
opposition, among those candidates that cover X.
Lomax says:
Okay, that rarity of rarities, an original post by me. A great deal of
criticism of voting methods is based on how the methods behave with
strategic voters, those who vote insincerely to gain some presumably
favorable outcome
I reply:
Mr. Lomax is missing the point. It isnt
Mike,
That's right. The C voters still have to use defensive strategy, but
the moving the approval cutoff is sufficient.
When there are only three candidates, UncAAO is the same as Smith
Approval.
Here's another classical example:
49 C
24 BA
27 AB
Under wv, this is not a Nash Equilibrium,
Chris,
For the benefit of those who are just joining us, I'll start a little
more basic than you would need.
We need to know the meaning of cover. A candidate X covers a
candidate Y if and only if X (pairwise) defeats both Y and each
candidate that Y defeats.
So if X covers Y, then in a
On Sat, 2007-03-03 at 02:06 -0500, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
And, please, explain to me why a method that will work well for
selecting pizzas, with sincere votes, will not work well selecting
political officers, similarly with sincere votes. If you think that.
If we cannot agree on the
At 10:52 PM 3/3/2007, Scott Ritchie wrote:
On Sat, 2007-03-03 at 02:06 -0500, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
And, please, explain to me why a method that will work well for
selecting pizzas, with sincere votes, will not work well selecting
political officers, similarly with sincere votes. If you
