On Mar 13, 2007, at 3:51 , Warren Smith wrote:
http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html
Venzke: These simulations purport to show that Range does
relatively well by SU
when voters are a mixture of strategic and sincere. This is pretty
tangential to what I wrote.
--what Venzke wrote was:
Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I used to think that I understood what strategic voting in Range
was, i.e., say I prefer ABC. And, say, I would rate them 1, 0.5,
and 0 respectively. Ah, but I really want A to win. So I rate B, not
at 0.5, but at 0.
I guess this
Juho wrote:
The Possible Approval Winner criterion looks actually quite natural
in the sense that it compares the results to what Approval voting
could have achieved.
I'm glad you think so.
The definition of the criterion contains a function that can be used
to evaluate the candidates
At 03:00 AM 3/13/2007, Juho wrote:
I guess you, as a Range expert, pretty well know what the anticipated
problematic scenarios are. Problems may arise e.g. when opinion polls
tell that Democrats would get only 49% of the votes (against 51% of
the Republicans) and therefore their supporters decide
What is the justification for Bayesian Regret, as used in IEVS and
described at http://rangevoting.org/BayRegDum.html, being the
uniquely right metric, the gold standard, for comparing different
election methods or varying election scenarios?
Why is the societal utility for a candidate the sum of
Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Seemed simple, I was exaggerating.
But wait! If I vote this way, it must be that I prefer A to B with
more strength than I prefer B to C. So the conditions of the problem
are contradictory.
What I'm saying is that I really
There is a conflict that exists between some people when counting a
simple yes|No ballot. Some would say that a simple majority is all that
is needed, while others would suggest an absolute majority or super
majority should be required for some decisions, still others would argue
for some
Chris--
You wrote:
Mike,
Does this compromising one C voter have to unapprove C?
I reply:
No.
Referring to this example,
52: AC (offensive order-reversal)
100: BA
50: C/B
You continued:
ACBA. Approvals: A152, C102, B100. AC 152-50, CB 102-100, BA 150-52
DMC and ASM
Is it the version of FBC that is being used in San Francisco?
Mike Ossipoff
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
One way that DAMC _won't_ fails FBC: If a majority rank Favorite over
Compromise, then, by voting Compromise over Favorite, you can't change the
fact that a majority have ranked Favorite over Compromise, and so you can't
get rid of that majority defeat of Compromise. That made it seem to me
Howard Swerdfeger writes:
There is a conflict that exists between some people when counting a
simple yes|No ballot. Some would say that a simple majority is all that
is needed, while others would suggest an absolute majority or super
majority should be required for some decisions, still
Here's a version of Beatpath that always picks from the uncovered set:
As in Beatpath(margins) or Beatpath(wv) we define a relation R
on the candidates as follows:
X R Y iff and only if there is a stronger beatpath from X to Y than
from Y to X.
This relation is transitive, and when there are
here is a quote plagiarized from an essay
The Emergence of Decision Analysis by Ralph F. Miles, Jr.:
--
Decision theory continued to develop through economics in the 18th Century.
Jeremy Bentham, in his Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789),
first suggested that utility in terms of
At 05:56 PM 3/13/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
The problem is that we have this idea of
exaggeration. But why would one exaggerate?
*Because they care.* In other words, it is not an exaggeration.
You can similarly say that if I rob a bank at gunpoint, I must have
genuinely needed the money.
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax writes:
At 05:56 PM 3/13/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
The problem is that we have this idea of
exaggeration. But why would one exaggerate?
*Because they care.* In other words, it is not an exaggeration.
You can similarly say that if I rob a bank at gunpoint, I must have
Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Chris--
You wrote:
Mike,
Does this compromising one C voter have to unapprove C?
I reply:
No.
Referring to this example,
52: AC (offensive order-reversal)
100: BA
50: C/B
You continued:
ACBA. Approvals: A152, C102, B100. AC 152-50, CB 102-100, BA
Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I don't really mind if you want to define strategic voting out of
existence. I don't think it sheds light on anything, though.
Just because you can't see that light doesn't mean it doesn't exist.
I have not defined strategic voting
On Mar 13, 2007, at 18:35 , Chris Benham wrote:
The definition of the criterion contains a function that can be
used to evaluate the candidates (also for other uses) - the
possibility and strength of an approval win. This function can be
modified to support also cardinal ratings.
In
On Mar 13, 2007, at 21:20 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 03:00 AM 3/13/2007, Juho wrote:
I guess you, as a Range expert, pretty well know what the anticipated
problematic scenarios are. Problems may arise e.g. when opinion polls
tell that Democrats would get only 49% of the votes (against
Some observations.
The description talks only about the yes votes. Is the assumption
that the no votes mean no action will be taken?
If we are talking about approving a new law then this is quite
typical, but if we vote for example about whether we should send our
rocket to Mars or Venus,
Juho wrote:
I don't see any strong need to use the PAW criterion (or
corresponding ratings variant) for strategy resistance or for
election target reasons but they seem possible. They add
complexity, but if justified for some reason, then why not. I'll try
to think more and come back if
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