On Jul 13, 2007, at 12:56 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> Yes, it does not solve all problems. But Approval Voting is a very
> good system, one of the best. Higher resolution Range is better. In
> the other direction, Condorcet methods are arguably better in some
> ways. Approval is *clearly* bet
On May 27, 2007, at 7:55 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I was thinking about Meek's method and the possibility of combing
> it with approval.
>
> There doesn't seem to be a definition of Meek's method on the
> wikipedia. Does it already allow equal rankings ?
>
I haven't seen an equal-ranki
On May 25, 2007, at 10:40 AM, James Gilmour wrote:
>> Brian Olson> Sent: 25 May 2007 17:59
>>
>> I think this reinforces my position that the current best mix of
>> speed, reliability, trustworthiness and cost is to have people
>> reading
>> ballots punching data into common desktop computers.
>
On Apr 20, 2007, at 7:41 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> I'm just taking the opportunity to note the similarity between
> multiwinner STV and Asset Voting. With multiwinner STV the vote
> transfers are guided by user rankings, and in Asset Voting, by,
> essentially, a proxy chosen by the voter. T
Meek's method elects A, C1 & C2 in this example.
On Apr 19, 2007, at 10:18 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I was thinking about an easier solution to the vote management
problem.
This is where it is sometimes in a party's interests to try to
split their support
equally between two candidate due
On Apr 17, 2007, at 9:54 AM, James Gilmour wrote:
>> From: Howard Swerdfeger > Sent: 17 April 2007 17:37
>>
>> Tactical voting is easy in STV.
>>
>> Step 1 : Determine what your preferred ranking is.
>> Step 2 : Determine who is sure to lose the election
>> Step 3 : Rank all candidates you are sur
On Apr 16, 2007, at 9:56 AM, Bob Richard wrote:
> The (alleged) complexity of STV is entirely a matter of the counting
> process; the task for the voter is actually very simple. Having said
> that, the conventional ways of explaining the count invariably lose
> audiences, and we need to learn how
r three seats, and then count the same ballots a second time
for two seats, after withdrawing the three winners from the first
round.
Beyond that, I'd either abandon staggered terms, or expand the
committee to six members.
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ftware in DREs causes additional problems; having, for
>example, a large opaque COTS operating system to evaluate in
>addition to the voting system software is not feasible.
The draft is available here:
http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
--
t down. This step is repeated until only one faction has any
>voters left standing.
Hmm.
100 voters on the left say give the baby to Mother A.
100 voters on the right say give the baby to Mother B.
1 voter in the middle, thoe compromiser, says cut the baby in half
and give half to each
opulation to
>within 100 people according to Census data and are still distorted in
>some extreme ways.
Wyoming and Montana each have one district, and 509,294 & 935,670
people respectively. Rhode Island has two districts and 1,076,189
people.
The 1% rule (or whatever) must be intra-state
...seems to have won in Oakland and Minneapolis.
An advisory measure for STV in Davis CA is ahead, but the count isn't done.
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
fied, but you get the general idea.)
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
voting while encouraging
insincere voting, however desirable they are once that presupposition
is granted. Obviously not everybody agrees with me
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
will
strategize, perhaps badly, perhaps well, perhaps with advice from
their party. And if you believe that a voter will strategize only
when she has high-quality information about the behavior of other
voters, you've never sat at a blackjack table and watched the other
players.
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
nder consideration, the easier it
>may be for an election method to satisfy the Condorcet criterion.
>
>The Wikipedia article is notably lacking any references.
Many of the election-methods Wikipedia articles leave a lot to be
desired (the Droop quota article is a good (bad) example).
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
At 8:07 AM -0700 7/27/06, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
>At 3:09 AM -0400 7/27/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>Btw, is the new law equivalent to the old run-off rules ? Would there
>>be no 2nd election if the winner of the first round got more than 40%
>>? Maybe, they were just t
the case. They've basically collapsed their
existing runoff system into a single election.
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
rately for each seat to be
>filled. The first counting results in the first winner. Then the
>second count proceeds without the name of the first winner. This
>process results in the second winner. For each additional seat to be
>filled, an additional count is done without the n
nklin. "This appears that this is an
idea from San Francisco, and I say we should leave it
in San Francisco."
This story can be found at:
http://www.journalnow.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=WSJ%2FMGArticle%2FWSJ_BasicArticle&c=MGArticle&cid=1149189266508&path=%21localn
s
of the candidates to a one-dimensional preference scale. But it's not
justified to leap from that mapping to the implicitly conclusion that
there's anything like a one-dimensional ranking of candidates that
comes close to capturing the real complexity of positions and issues
and subjective judgements.
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
At 5:12 PM -0500 6/28/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>Quoting Jonathan Lundell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>>
>> IRV's problem with ignoring later preferences and not always finding
>> a Condorcet winner is a direct consequence of the way it avoids
>> Condo
st sincere ballots regardless of the counting system. Neither
claim is provable a priori.
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ty voting ranking). So, for example:
This approach doesn't deal with clones very well, I think. They'll
tend to be seeded low and all eliminated.
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Free-range voting?
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
loting among the
members of G or, if the problem is endemic, among all voters. The
nearer that limit is approached, the lower the probability that
advantages claimed for approval voting will be realized..
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
layed out in the 1796 and 1800 presidential election, where the
>presidential electors (who at that time had two equally weighted
>votes), made strategic mistakes with major consequences in both
>elections. Nagel used to say approval voting was better, but now
>says IRV is better.
--
them in a statistical tie. That's not an uncommon situation, and
the Condorcet strategy of burying would have been trivial to
implement.
With IRV, I'd be interested in knowing what the strategy would be in
the above election.
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
nth element of an array, and get the index in an
>array of the nth-largest element.
Meek's method (and Warren's) for STV are iterative.
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
t, but a clash of
>definitions may cause misunderstanding if we do not take great
>care.It is not my purpose in this note to examine the relative
>merits, or lack of merits, of these two systems, but only to warn
>that they are very different, and that the name AV is,
>unfortu
o trying for a
compromise.
"So, because you are lukewarm, and neither cold
nor hot, I am about to spit you out of my mouth."
Revelation 3:16.
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
required 100 bytes to represent each
presidential vote (and that's got to be way high), we'd have 1.2GB.
If Brian's roughly 50:1 compression ratio held, we'd have only 24MB
of data to communicate to the vote counters in DC (or wherever).
So even in a very large election,
e Condorcet winner doesn't figure.
Also, I see either IRV or Condorcet methods as so much better than
the alternatives that we shouldn't overstate the defects of either
one, compared to the much greater defects of (especially) simple
plurality elections.
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
a representation, suitable represented in a text file, could be used
to collect and aggregate ballots from district subdivisions.
>On Mon, 13 Mar 2006 21:53:44 -0800 Jonathan Lundell wrote, and I see
>nothing valuable to read.
I get that a lot. :-(
>On Mon, 13 Mar 2006 22:58:36 -0500
;best" choice by nearly any
measure, especially in a factionalized election.
It comes down to STV (IRV) or one of the Condorcet methods (of which
the Schulze method is worth a close look).
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
lue)
5: Bob Kiss (C03)
4: Hinda Miller (C04)
3: Kevin J. Curley (C02)
2: Louie The Cowman Beaudin (C01)
1: Loyal Ploof (C05)
0: Write-ins (C06)
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ibute to the = rankings.
Interestingly (I guess) Kiss and Miller had almost equal approval
counts (that is, they were each mentioned on very close to the same
number of ballots).
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/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
resupposes that the voters are unanimous in
voting for civil war, even though they don't agree on who should lead
it.
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
self: we should expect a different election profile
depending on whether we run an election with STV or Condorcet rules.
No doubt we'll always be examining IRV elections for Condorcet
upsets, but the interpretation of such an event (which we do not
appear to have in Burlington) is non-trivial.
formed, and somewhat rational, and we must
expect that the specific election rules in place will have some
effect on voter behavior.
--
/Jonathan Lundell.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Let me generalize my argument.
If an IRV election comes down to two candidates left standing, and
one of those candidates is also the Condorcet winner, then the
Condorcet winner must also be the IRV winner.
That seems to be the case in the Burlington example.
--
/Jonathan Lundell
At 11:08 PM -0500 3/10/06, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>At 09:39 PM 3/10/2006, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
>> >Thanks for doing this analysis! This is BIG news in the small world
>>>of voting methods! :-)
>>
>>How so? It's well known that IRV/AV/STV doesn't
or spoiled and
>truncated ballots correctly?
>
>Thanks for doing this analysis! This is BIG news in the small world
>of voting methods! :-)
How so? It's well known that IRV/AV/STV doesn't necessarily find the
Condorcet winner. It shouldn't be too surprising that there are
rea
result of a poorly designed electoral system.
Unfortunately, when you are trying to jump-start democracy, the devil
is in the details.
Steven Hill is director of New America Foundation's political reform
program (www.NewAmerica.net/politicalreform) and author of "Fixing
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