Clarifications on my claim that range voting strategies use extremes:
1) This claim is only valid in large elections, not small ones. See Myerson and
Weber's paper, which is cited in mine, for details on the reasonable
assumptions made for this claim.
2) It is true that if a voter is indifferent t
There are several elements of the Beaumont poll that bias it away
from real-world behavior.
1. The poll was a poll, not an election. There were no consequences
to the answers, hence no incentive to answer tactically.
2. The poll asks for an indication of preferences, not a vote.
3. The poll in
On Nov 13, 2006, at 22:51 , Warren Smith wrote:
>> Laatu:
> You used the same word "poll" that I used. People obviously 1) didn't
> have any major reason to try to force the results in any direction
> and 2) probably were not told and did not understand the strategic
> possibilities of Range Votin
>Laatu:
You used the same word "poll" that I used. People obviously 1) didn't
have any major reason to try to force the results in any direction
and 2) probably were not told and did not understand the strategic
possibilities of Range Voting. People may also typically want to
answer sincere
On Nov 13, 2006, at 20:13 , Warren Smith wrote:
>> Juho Laatu:
> I think Range Voting is quite ok for opinion polls and corresponding
> fully non-contentious elections (e.g. www.imdb.com), but as soon as
> there is an element of competition Approval style voting is the
> likely outcome.
>
>
> --th
>Juho Laatu:
I think Range Voting is quite ok for opinion polls and corresponding
fully non-contentious elections (e.g. www.imdb.com), but as soon as
there is an element of competition Approval style voting is the
likely outcome.
--the exit poll we made of the 2004 US Presidential election,
Juho wrote:
> Some more proposals:
>
> 1) In E the average value was used to make the division to max and
> min. Also 50% of the candidates getting max and 50% min could be one
> strategy.
I guess that's what Forest meant with "above median utility approval".
Another question: Don't these r
On Nov 12, 2006, at 23:44 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Juho wrote:
>> Some more proposals:
>>
>> 1) In E the average value was used to make the division to max and
>> min. Also 50% of the candidates getting max and 50% min could be one
>> strategy.
>
> I guess that's what Forest meant with "above medi
Some more proposals:
1) In E the average value was used to make the division to max and
min. Also 50% of the candidates getting max and 50% min could be one
strategy.
2) I understood that all voters always had the same strategy. It
would be good to test also cases where one voter or a group
Warren Smith wrote:
> Kevin Venzke posted some news about range voting strategy.
> I have now written considerably more extensive simulator than his
> (but inspired by his) and the results are interesting.
>Somewhat contrary to what Venzke seemed to be concluding,
> my conclusion is that "hon
Kevin Venzke posted some news about range voting strategy.
I have now written considerably more extensive simulator than his
(but inspired by his) and the results are interesting.
Somewhat contrary to what Venzke seemed to be concluding,
my conclusion is that "honest" range voting (scaled
so y
I have written up decent proofs of a lot of theorems about range voting
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/RVstrat.pdf
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/RVstrat.ps
this also includes the first explanation of optimum strategy in a large variety
of voting systems, includign COAF systems, range, Condo
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