Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-17 Thread Juho
One small additional trick for the alternative method (described below). The receipts could have two parts. The voter could tear the parts apart and give one of them to some organisation (maybe right after stepping out from the voting location) that takes care of checking that the election w

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-15 Thread Dave Ketchum
On Sun, 15 Oct 2006 20:56:21 +0300 Juho wrote: > On Oct 15, 2006, at 20:06 , Dave Ketchum wrote: > > >>On Sun, 15 Oct 2006 13:24:48 +0300 Juho wrote: >> >>>On Oct 15, 2006, at 7:02 , Dave Ketchum wrote: >>> Note that many voters will vote the same as for Plurality, for which a special

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-15 Thread Juho
On Oct 15, 2006, at 20:06 , Dave Ketchum wrote: > On Sun, 15 Oct 2006 13:24:48 +0300 Juho wrote: >> On Oct 15, 2006, at 7:02 , Dave Ketchum wrote: >>> Note that many voters will vote the same as for Plurality, for >>> which a special form might be possible. >> Yes, there is space for optimisati

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-15 Thread Dave Ketchum
On Sun, 15 Oct 2006 13:24:48 +0300 Juho wrote: > On Oct 15, 2006, at 7:02 , Dave Ketchum wrote: > > >>Note that many voters will vote the same as for Plurality, for >>which a special form might be possible. > > > Yes, there is space for optimisation. Storing plurality style votes > as they

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-15 Thread Juho
P.S. Works best with margins. Juho On Oct 15, 2006, at 13:24 , Juho wrote: > On Oct 15, 2006, at 7:02 , Dave Ketchum wrote: > >> Note that many voters will vote the same as for Plurality, for >> which a special form might be possible. > > Yes, there is space for optimisation. Storing plurality

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-15 Thread Juho
On Oct 15, 2006, at 7:02 , Dave Ketchum wrote: > Note that many voters will vote the same as for Plurality, for > which a special form might be possible. Yes, there is space for optimisation. Storing plurality style votes as they are should not be a big problem (for privacy in most cases).

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-14 Thread Dave Ketchum
On Sat, 14 Oct 2006 12:13:12 +0300 Juho wrote: > On Oct 14, 2006, at 5:30 , Dave Ketchum wrote: > Is it compatible with Condorcet? I remain a backer for Condorcet's combining capability with tolerable complexity. >>> >>> I think yes, but unfortunately it is more difficult to serve >>

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-14 Thread Juho
On Oct 14, 2006, at 5:30 , Dave Ketchum wrote: >>> Is it compatible with Condorcet? I remain a backer for Condorcet's >>> combining capability with tolerable complexity. >> I think yes, but unfortunately it is more difficult to serve >> Condorcet than e.g. plurality (one has to trade a bit wit

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-13 Thread Dave Ketchum
Adding a couple trivial notes: On Fri, 13 Oct 2006 18:38:43 +0300 Juho wrote: > On Oct 11, 2006, at 2:58 , David Cary wrote: > > >>--- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> >> >>>ps, As to privacy, I read of video-camera phones. Their usage has >>>to be tricky - can they verify a voter's a

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-13 Thread Dave Ketchum
On Fri, 13 Oct 2006 18:28:18 +0300 Juho wrote: > On Oct 9, 2006, at 1:15 , Dave Ketchum wrote: > > >>Is 3ballot worth the pain? > > > I think Rivest proved the concept to work. He obviously also tried to > make the method as usable as possible. Wether benefits are bigger > than pain may dep

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-13 Thread Juho
On Oct 11, 2006, at 2:58 , David Cary wrote: > --- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> ps, As to privacy, I read of video-camera phones. Their usage has >> to be tricky - can they verify a voter's actual vote as such > without >> voting machine operation being set up compatible with such

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-13 Thread Juho
On Oct 9, 2006, at 1:15 , Dave Ketchum wrote: > Is 3ballot worth the pain? I think Rivest proved the concept to work. He obviously also tried to make the method as usable as possible. Wether benefits are bigger than pain may depend on where the system is used. In countries with no tradition

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-13 Thread Dave Ketchum
On Tue, 10 Oct 2006 16:58:35 -0700 (PDT) David Cary wrote: > --- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > >>ps, As to privacy, I read of video-camera phones. Their usage has >>to be tricky - can they verify a voter's actual vote as such > > without > >>voting machine operation

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-10 Thread David Cary
--- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > ps, As to privacy, I read of video-camera phones. Their usage has > to be tricky - can they verify a voter's actual vote as such without > voting machine operation being set up compatible with such? > > ps, quoting: "I doubt there is a voting system

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-08 Thread Dave Ketchum
Validation takes a long list: Easy to do valid setup. Easy for voter to use. Protects voter privacy. Conceded impossible if only one voter uses the machine, but ballots can be stored in random order for normal usage. Does accurate counting. Hard to do anything simila

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-08 Thread Ka-Ping Yee
On Sun, 8 Oct 2006, Dave Ketchum wrote: > Is it worth bothering with without demanding a TRUE voting machine for its > installation? ABSOLUTELY NOT, for there are too many ways to falsify the > counting! > > Given a TRUE voting machine, why add 3ballot? ZERO value in this effort. What do you mea

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-08 Thread Dave Ketchum
Is 3ballot worth the pain? Does it REALLY provide the claimed service? Does it complicate the voters' lives? Is it compatible with Condorcet? I remain a backer for Condorcet's combining capability with tolerable complexity. Is it worth bothering with without demanding a TRUE voting machine fo

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-06 Thread David Cary
--- Warren Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Then still, your (KPY's) attack idea is still applicable even in > just one > race (if there are enough candidates, e.g. 135 in the CA governor > Schwarzenegger race) > and Rivest includes discussion of this attack in his (latest! but > not his origi

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-03 Thread Warren Smith
To KPY: I thought you had in mind, computer randomizes pattern and prints out the 3 ballot plus 1 copy (it decides which). That is a disaster since enables trivial vote buying using statistical effects. If same, but YOU decide which to copy, then the scheme still is vulnerable to statistical e

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-03 Thread raphfrk
 Warren Smith wds at math.temple.edu wrote: > [The specified pattern] attack appears to be quite devastating to me. > I personally regard Rivest's scheme as therefore dead or anyway on the critical list, > for purpose of applying it to plurality voting.  Rivest has a few lame attempts > to res

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-02 Thread Ka-Ping Yee
On Mon, 2 Oct 2006, Warren Smith wrote: > Somebody needs to waterboard Rivest until he sees the light, which > is that his method works synergistically with range and approval voting. > (I don't even think the WORDS "approval voting" even OCCUR in Rivest's > paper, even the revised one, which shows

[EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-02 Thread Warren Smith
>Ka-Ping Yee: I'm talking about "marking the ballot" by filling in bubbles, not by scribbling on it. There may be enough down-ballot contests in many elections (at least in the U. S.) that the vote-buyer could instruct a voter to create a distinct pattern of filled bubbles in down-ballot contests.

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-02 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 12:07 AM 10/2/2006, Jan Kok wrote: >On 10/1/06, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >This can be alleviated by putting different contests on different ballots. > >There is still the possibility of mischief if there are many >candidates in a contest. Very difficult. However, what ab

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-02 Thread mrouse1
>>Warren Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> A revolutionary new protocol called "3ballot" was introduced in September 2006 by MIT's Turing-award-winning cryptographer Ron Rivest. You know, you said this, and I didn't even realize that Rivest was the R in the RSA public key encryption algorithm. A very brig

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-01 Thread Jan Kok
On 10/1/06, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > At 08:49 PM 10/1/2006, Ka-Ping Yee wrote: > >I'm talking about "marking the ballot" by filling in bubbles, not > >by scribbling on it. There may be enough down-ballot contests in > >many elections (at least in the U. S.) that the vote-bu

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-01 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 08:49 PM 10/1/2006, Ka-Ping Yee wrote: >I'm talking about "marking the ballot" by filling in bubbles, not >by scribbling on it. There may be enough down-ballot contests in >many elections (at least in the U. S.) that the vote-buyer could >instruct a voter to create a distinct pattern of filled

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-01 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 12:54 PM 10/1/2006, Brian Olson wrote: >The down side is the strategy arguments about casting an honest ballot vs >casting a ballot more likely to get you some of what you want. Straight >ratings does not promote honest voting, but instead promotes saturating >your ballot to the min and max of w

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-01 Thread Ka-Ping Yee
Hi, Warren, and thanks for your response. > The > inconvenience might be the real killer obstacle here.--true.. > definitely a worry. > > --Australia makes rank ordering all candidates on all races, > compulsory for every voter (and voting also is compulsory). Good point. I hadn't thought of tha

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-01 Thread Brian Olson
On Sat, 30 Sep 2006, Warren Smith wrote: >> B.Olson: >> The down side is that since this directly accomplishes summation of the >> ratings, per-ballot-rating methods such as IRNR and raking-derivation to >> Borda or Condorcet/VRR are not possible [with 3ballot]. > > --well, whether this is a "down

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-01 Thread mrouse1
(I sent this yesterday morning, but unfortunately I cut and pasted [EMAIL PROTECTED] instead of [EMAIL PROTECTED] Anyway, it still seems on-topic.) I read through "Rivest-TheThreeBallotVotingSystem.pdf," and I was wondering one thing. It says: To vote FOR a candidate, you must fill in exactly two

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-10-01 Thread raphfrk
he laws" www.wikocracy.com     -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: election-methods@electorama.com Sent: Sun, 1 Oct 2006 5:14 AM Subject: Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections > Ka-

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-09-30 Thread Warren Smith
> Ka-Ping Yee > discussion of 3ballot at http://usablesecurity.com/ RESPONSE BY Warren D Smith: >How hard would it be to get voters to properly mark three ballots (or a perforated ballot with three separable columns)? The instructions are simple — mark one or two in each row — but it may not be s

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-09-30 Thread Warren Smith
>B.Olson: >The down side is that since this directly accomplishes summation of the >ratings, per-ballot-rating methods such as IRNR and raking-derivation to >Borda or Condorcet/VRR are not possible [with 3ballot]. --well, whether this is a "down side" depends on your point of view. I personally re

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-09-30 Thread Warren Smith
>M.Rouse: >Very interesting method. Just a quick question. The article mentions that >rank-order methods would be really tough to do. Wouldn't the method just >be two votes with the correct rank-order and one with the reverse order? --that is an interesting point. I had been imagining handling Co

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-09-30 Thread Ka-Ping Yee
On Fri, 29 Sep 2006, Warren Smith wrote: > A revolutionary new protocol called "3ballot" was introduced in > September 2006 by MIT's Turing-award-winning cryptographer Ron Rivest. Intriguing! I participated in a discussion with several other Berkeley students about it today, and posted some of my

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-09-29 Thread Brian Olson
I'm not sure about rankings, but Warren's extension to ratings is neat and straightforward. Rivest mentions that his three ballot checker machine would have to enforce the single-vote plurality rules as an extra check that could just be removed, losing nothing of the benefits of three-ballot.

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-09-29 Thread mrouse1
Very interesting method. Just a quick question. The article mentions that rank-order methods would be really tough to do. Wouldn't the method just be two votes with the correct rank-order and one with the reverse order? If you wanted A>B>C, you'd have two votes for that and one for C>B>A. Borda wou

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-09-29 Thread raphfrk
ful.   Raphfrk Interesting site "what if anyone could modify the laws" www.wikocracy.com     -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: election-methods@electorama.com Sent: Fri, 29 Sep 2006 6:05 PM Subject: Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secur

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-09-29 Thread Brian Olson
Nevermind, google shall provide, this must be it: http://theory.csail.mit.edu/~rivest/Rivest-TheThreeBallotVotingSystem.pdf Brian Olson http://bolson.org/ election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-09-29 Thread Brian Olson
Sounds interesting, can you post a link to Rivest's original paper on this? Or at least a Bibliographical entry on what journal it was published in? Brian Olson http://bolson.org/ election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

2006-09-29 Thread Warren Smith
A revolutionary new protocol called "3ballot" was introduced in September 2006 by MIT's Turing-award-winning cryptographer Ron Rivest. It accomplishes the seemingly incompatible goals of 1. Each voter's vote is secret, preventing vote-selling and coercion. 2. Each voter can verify that his vote