Antonio Oneala lamented that proportional Condorcet methods tend to be
intractable. This is because if there are N candidates from which to choose K
winners, there are C(N,K)=N!/(K!*(N-K)!) subsets to be compared pairwise, for
a total of C(C(N,K),2) pairwise comparisons of subsets.
] On Behalf Of Simmons,
Forest
Sent: Monday, May 01, 2006 2:29 PM
To: election-methods@electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Proportional Condorcet Voting
Antonio Oneala lamented that proportional Condorcet methods tend to be
intractable. This is because if there are N candidates from which to choose
K winners
At 03:29 PM 5/1/2006, Simmons, Forest wrote:
However, suppose that instead of comparing all C(N,K) of the K
candidate subsets, we just compare all submitted proposals,
including those sets that would be elected by STV under various
rules (Droop Quota, etc.). There might be ten thousand such
At 05:52 PM 5/1/2006, Antonio Oneala wrote:
As for the other reply to my thread, I'm not a fan of asset
either. I have a feeling it will enforce party structures, as a
candidate inside of a party is far more likely to give it to another
candidate in the party than to and independent.
Sure.
It's not a question of whether the method can be quickly worked out by a computer. It's a question of whether the method is transparent enough for an average voter to look at a small set of data and quickly work out who the proper winner is. Alex SmallAbd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: Date: Mon, 01
At 08:45 PM 5/1/2006, Alex Small wrote:
It's not a question of whether the method can be quickly worked out
by a computer. It's a question of whether the method is transparent
enough for an average voter to look at a small set of data and
quickly work out who the proper winner is.
That would
All of the proportional condorcet methods I've heard of so far rely on STV to some extent. While this may be useful for ease of use (I'm not sure, I still don't completely understand them) in CPO-STV and sequential STV, it isn't really the best way to apportion the votes, as it introduces some of
Antonio Oneala wrote:
All of the proportional condorcet methods I've heard of so far rely on
STV to some extent.
PSC-CLE doesn't rely on STV. However, the simplicity comes at a price:
80: ABCDEF
40: DEFABC
Winners of a 3-seat election are A, B, D.
10: X1ABCDEF
10: X2ABCDEF
10: X3ABCDEF
10:
