At 9:28 AM -0400 6/30/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>What about a method with determines the IRV winner and the Condorcet
>winner and then selects one of them using a random ballot. I assume
>that someone has already suggested it.
>
>It seems to me that if you included a reasonable number of elec
From: Simmons, Forest <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Any time that IRV does not elect the sincere CW (when there is one)
there
> is going to be a strong incentive for order reversal under IRV,
except under
> the (non-existent) zero information case. [The only real life cases
that
> exist in hot election
Any time that IRV does not elect the sincere CW (when there is one) there is
going to be a strong incentive for order reversal under IRV, except under the
(non-existent) zero information case. [The only real life cases that exist in
hot elections are the positive information and positive disinf
