Hi Raph,
--- En date de : Dim 19.10.08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 4:29 PM, Kevin Venzke
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Actually even if exactly one candidate had majority
> approval, that would
> > not guarantee that they would win a runoff.
>
> It would
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Lun 20.10.08, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Your suggested possibilities had best have STRONG arguments
> to overpower
> known facts:
Yes, I'm aware of this.
Kevin Venzke
__
Do You Yahoo!?
En finir avec le
This topic has inspired an ocean of words - too many to respond to in
detaii. I will respond based on my memory of New York State law - I
believe close enough to be useful.
Elections in which the voter can only name one candidate, such as FPTP,
desperately need primaries to help each party su
Your suggested possibilities had best have STRONG arguments to overpower
known facts:
EVERY member of the cycle has been compared with each candidate outside,
with the cycle members being voted better liked by the voters in EVERY such
comparison.
DWK
On Sun, 19 Oct 2008 14:39:15 + (GMT)
Parties could not tolerate voters making THEIR OWN choices - but it took
three strikes to fire Vito!
Original Message
Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2007 23:32:59 -0400
From: Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
This law had what seems like a simple purpose - Republicans and Democrats
were DES
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 1:42 PM, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 8:04 PM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Because they cannot even run otherwise. I know it isn't the same as a
>> gun to your head, but it wouldn't even occur if they didn't have an
>> artific
Greg Nisbet wrote:
> =I think my dismissal is warranted. I trust society to represent its
> own interests more than some external source would. I am not saying
> dismiss every method that does so, but count involuntary changes to
> society against it.
My only proposal is to allow individuals to ex
I have an idea for a new 3-slot voting method:
*Voters fill out 3-slot ratings ballots, default rating is bottom-most
(indicating least preferred and not approved).
Interpreting top and middle rating as approval, disqualify all candidates
with an approval score lower than their approval-oppositio
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 8:04 PM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Because they cannot even run otherwise. I know it isn't the same as a
> gun to your head, but it wouldn't even occur if they didn't have an
> artificial monopoly on power.
Do you consider making them legally compulsory (sore
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 7:43 PM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Interesting point...
>
> Will there be factorial as many candidates?
No, but there is a point of decreasing returns. Is 10 options is
better than 1 option, but 100 options isn't that much better than 10.
>
> Since the vote
Hello Michael,
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2008 13:28:43 -0400
From: Michael Allan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [EM] You Can't Have it Both Ways - the Voters Can
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Hello Greg,
(I already agre
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 11:52 AM, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 7:32 PM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 6:30 AM, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>> Well, it depends on how popular the candidate is. There would be some
>>>
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 7:33 PM, Dan Bishop <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Raph Frank wrote:
>> I agree with you on 4 (Criminal Record). If criminals are having an
>> effect on the voting system, then you have to [sic] many people in prison.
>
> No, it simply means that your elections are /that/ clo
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 7:32 PM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 6:30 AM, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Well, it depends on how popular the candidate is. There would be some
>> candidates who can disregard primary results and some who can't. It
>> only
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 6:40 AM, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 7:22 AM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Iterative systems are based on "conditional" votes, meaning their
>> relative values change with regard to what has "happened". For
>> example, your vo
Sorry, forgot to add:
It is possible that between the main election and the runoff, voter
opinions would change.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 4:29 PM, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Actually even if exactly one candidate had majority approval, that would
> not guarantee that they would win a runoff.
It would depend on strategy. However, if exactly one candidate has
majority approval and nobody else do
Raph Frank wrote:
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 8:09 AM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Breaking a bit with voting methods, I would like to bring up another
issue regarding one's ability to influence politics: suffrage.
As the only one here not legally qualified to vote, I must express
dis
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 6:30 AM, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 6:55 AM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> My thoughts on primaries were challenged. Let me explain:
>>
>> Primaries may be the rational response to FPTP. It doesn't matter.
>> Without Draconian
Hello Greg,
(I already agree with your arguments. I'm rolling them at another
question.)
Greg Nisbet wrote:
> As a brief overview, I was more criticizing the motives of people than
> suggesting a particular plan. Any plan that some person touts changing
> society in manner X shouldn't really be
Hi,
--- En date de : Dim 19.10.08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a
écrit :
> > That being said, I think the most promising area of
> development here is
> > based around the concept of a "conditional
> vote" that came up a few
> > threads ago. The idea here being that individual
>
Greg Nisbet wrote:
Instant Range-off Voting is an interesting idea. I thought about it once
a while ago too. I didn't renormalize the ballots though, I just set the
co-highest to 100 and the co-lowest to 0 for each ballot as a sanitation
measure. I eventually abadoned it due to nonmonotonicity,
2008/10/19 Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 4:18 PM, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Maybe I haven't read closely enough. I thought the method was to simply
> > have a runoff between the top two approved candidates.
> >
> > In the example mentioned, it didn't se
Hi Raph,
--- En date de : Dim 19.10.08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 4:18 PM, Kevin Venzke
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Maybe I haven't read closely enough. I thought the
> method was to simply
> > have a runoff between the top two approved candidates.
> >
Warren Smith wrote:
1. the right way to compare election methods is "Bayesian Regret"
(BR). http://rangevoting.org/BayRegDum.html
For a long time I thought this was only applicable for single-winner
voting methods. However, I eventually saw how to do it for
multiwinner methods also:
http://gro
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 4:18 PM, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Maybe I haven't read closely enough. I thought the method was to simply
> have a runoff between the top two approved candidates.
>
> In the example mentioned, it didn't seem to me that anybody had majority
> approval, in whi
A clarification:
--- En date de : Dim 19.10.08, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> In the example mentioned, it didn't seem to me that
> anybody had majority
> approval, in which case it isn't clear who would win a
> runoff.
Actually even if exactly one candidate had majority approval,
Hi Raph,
--- En date de : Dim 19.10.08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 3:47 PM, Kevin Venzke
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > The second method isn't clone-independent either,
> given the possibility
> > that B could defeat a single A, but lose if A is
> cloned.
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 3:47 PM, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> The second method isn't clone-independent either, given the possibility
> that B could defeat a single A, but lose if A is cloned.
However, if B is preferred to A by a majority, then those voters
shouldn't approve A at all.
Hi Greg,
--- En date de : Dim 19.10.08, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> I question what the behavior of AT2R has to do with the
> original
> topic, but here's my two cents.
>
> With regards to clones:
>
> 8 A
> 7 B
> 6 C
>
> The A vs B faceoff is correct. Moving on...
>
> 8 A
> 8
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Sam 18.10.08, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Given a Condorcet cycle, how does anyone justify awarding a
> winner outside?
Two possibilities:
1. to simplify the definition of the method
2. to satisfy other strategy criteria.
Kevin Venzke
_
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 2:14 PM, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hmm, only kick out the losingest loser. I kinda think there would still be
> discontinuities, but it might be better. Probably worth trying. Now I just
> need to code that up and run the diagram code. Dunno when I'll actually
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 8:09 AM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Breaking a bit with voting methods, I would like to bring up another
> issue regarding one's ability to influence politics: suffrage.
>
> As the only one here not legally qualified to vote, I must express
> dissatisfaction wi
Greg Nisbet wrote:
Breaking a bit with voting methods, I would like to bring up another
issue regarding one's ability to influence politics: suffrage.
As the only one here not legally qualified to vote, I must express
dissatisfaction with the status quo.
There were several historical requiremen
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 7:22 AM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Iterative systems are based on "conditional" votes, meaning their
> relative values change with regard to what has "happened". For
> example, your vote shifting to a less preferred candidate in IRV is a
> result of a more pre
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 6:55 AM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> My thoughts on primaries were challenged. Let me explain:
>
> Primaries may be the rational response to FPTP. It doesn't matter.
> Without Draconian sore loser, candidate oppression laws the parties
> would have no way of sto
Hmm, only kick out the losingest loser. I kinda think there would
still be discontinuities, but it might be better. Probably worth
trying. Now I just need to code that up and run the diagram code.
Dunno when I'll actually get around to that.
Has anyone checked what happens to regular IRV un
Dear Steve,
in my old post
http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-April/012735.html,
some simulations are reporterd. There the following sentence is found:
"Judging from who beats whom, max. length, mean length, or sum of
defeats, we get MAM > River+ > Beat
The stalemate continues. In the meantime here is a pro-range argument.
I'm not going to bother to quote ones from CRV. Those have probably
all been discussed ad infinitum.
Impacts of strategic voting:
Ballot compression is less worrisome than offensive order reversal.
There scenarios under which
I question what the behavior of AT2R has to do with the original
topic, but here's my two cents.
With regards to clones:
8 A
7 B
6 C
The A vs B faceoff is correct. Moving on...
8 A
8 A*
7 B
6 C
A vs A* faceoff is also correct here is why.
What you accuse of being clone-positivity is in fact
Breaking a bit with voting methods, I would like to bring up another
issue regarding one's ability to influence politics: suffrage.
As the only one here not legally qualified to vote, I must express
dissatisfaction with the status quo.
There were several historical requirements for being able to
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