My point was ONLY that the voter could have equal feeling as to the
frontrunners. Here Abd offers some thought on that topic.
DWK
On Fri, 05 Dec 2008 13:53:09 -0500 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 11:31 PM 12/4/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Favored frontrunner? Trying to add some thought.
Agree
Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Mon, 1/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Then you should advocate Minmax for being Minmax, not for
being Condorcet compliant. If you do the latter, then people
may argue that the system is inconsistent because it
doesn't follow up the implication
At 10:37 AM 12/5/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Something I've always wondered about Asset Voting. Say you have a
very selfish electorate who all vote for themselves (or for their
friends). From what I understand, those voted for in the first round
become the electors who decide among them
Suppose that the voters are distributed uniformly on a disc with center C, and
that they are voting to
choose from among several locations for a community center.
Then no matter how many locations on the ballot, if the voters rank them from
nearest to furthest, the
location nearest to C will b
At 11:31 PM 12/4/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Favored frontrunner? Trying to add some thought.
Agreed to "first rate a favorite and the worst".
Then the standard thought is "the voter rates the frontrunners".
This needs careful thought. It is likely that one of the
frontruners will win. This
At 05:15 PM 12/4/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
If you think the risk is too great even so, have a preface
adjustment where all candidates that fall below a threshold of first
votes are eliminated. The threshold should be very low, say 10. This
will introduce some compromising incentive, b
At 02:47 PM 12/4/2008, Peter Barath wrote:
Do you think that if we vote simply with money, the rich have
more power than the poor? Yes, it is true. And exactly that is
the situation right now, too.
Actually, it's not true, it depends on what is done with the money.
Suppose, for example, the ex
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 12:34 AM 12/3/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Mon, 1/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > One approach to sincerity is to compare voter
> behaviour to the requested behaviour. In Approval if the
> request is to mark all candidates that one appro
I like these ideas for varying sigma and keeping down the computational cost of
detecting failure of starlike
win regions.
Let sigma1 and sigma2, respectively, be the distance between the two closest
and the distance between
the two most widely separated candidates. Then a range of values bet
At 12:35 AM 12/3/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
Approval is a special case since the votes are so
simple that it is hard to tell when one votes in
line with one's sincere opinion and when not.
Rational Approval votes are never "out of line" with one's sincere
opinion." In Approval, equal ranking, whe
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
But want simple and maximally powerful? Asset Voting. Terminally simple
as a voting method. Ideal strategy: identify the eligible person (could
be yourself!) whom you most trust to make a good decision in your
absence, because you will be absent, as a voter, until th
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